John Hunt Morgan and His Raiders, and: Mounted Raids of the Civil War (review)

book reviews365 garrisoned" is well done. The use of maps, illustrations, and contemporary photographs greatly enhance the value of the book. However, the book does have its shortcomings. Preciseness is at times sacrificed for literary flow and style and the result is a number of minor errors. The characterization of Maryland affairs also suffers from this. But despite this criticism the book is a welcome addition and has much of value in it for both the scholar and general reader. Richard R. Duncan Georgetown University John Hunt Morgan and His Raiders. By Edson H. Thomas. (Lexington : The University Press of Kentucky, 1975. Pp. XIII, 120. $3.95.) Mounted Raids of the Civil War. By Edward G. Longacre. (New York: A. S. Barnes and Company, 1975. Pp. 348. $12.00.) Mr. Thomas' book is published under the sponsorship of the Kentucky Historical Events Commission as one of the volumes in the Kentucky Bicentennial Bookshelf. The author remarks in his Introduction that "in Kentucky . . . one is either for [Morgan] or against him; there is no middle ground." He himself is clearly a member of the pro-Morgan school. This brief story of Morgan's career leaves undisturbed his status as one of the demigods of the Lost Cause. It would be unfair to fault Mr. Thomas for not writing a book different from the one he chose to write, or to criticize his failure to discuss the many questions about Morgan's strange personality and the value of his services to the Confederacy that a more extensive and thorough-going study would have had to consider. Mr. Thomas is content to leave Morgan on his pedestal. He accepts and repeats every major tenet in the Morgan hagiography. Thus: General "Jerry" Boyle is thrown into "a state of frenzy" by the First Kentucky Raid; Morgan has "permission from General [E. Kirby] Smith to select his own route of departure" at the conclusion of the Bragg-Smith invasion of Kentucky; "the Federals put up a determined resistance" at Hartsville on December 8, 1862; Morgan's officers ask Secretary of War Seddon to order an investigation of the Mount Sterling bank robbery, "hoping to curry favor with Richmond," etc. However sanctified such statements may be by 110 years of pious repetition, none of them is defensible. Mr. Thomas also repeats the traditional accounts of Morgan's escape from the penitentiary in Columbus, and the circumstances surrounding his death in Greeneville, Tennessee. It is possible that these accounts are correct, but both have been questioned, and with considerable justification. In sum, Mr. Thomas has done his loyal best for an exceedingly complex, controversial figure, but his 366 CIVIL WAR HISTORY attractively written, entertaining account is not one that an objective historian can safely accept. Mounted Raids of the Civil War tells the stories of twelve of the most "newsworthy" cavalry raids of the war. Keeping a praiseworthy balance between the Blue and the Gray, Mr. Longacre gives equal billing to the exploits of Stuart, Van Dom, "Grumble" Jones —Imboden, Morgan, Wheeler and Forrest on the one hand, and those of Streight, Grierson, Stoneman, Kilpatrick—Dahlgren, Sheridan and Wilson on the other. Each of the twelve raids is carefully placed within its strategic setting, and its incidents are narrated with commendable skill. Notwithstanding his extensive bibliography, the author relies in the main on secondary sources. He aims at a general audience, and with twelve rattling good stories in his armory, he is well on target. His book will entertain and please the many chairbome cavalrymen in the ranks of Civil War aficionados. The total absence of maps, essential in such a work as this, is a serious flaw. This reviewer regrets also that the author has not come to grips with the basic questions raised by his subject. We concede the glamour of these raids, and that they caused temporary inconvenience or disruption, but what was their true military value? With the exception of Van Dorn's Holly Springs raid, did any of them have a strategic effect in any real sense? Were they worth their cost? The author's scholarship is generally sound, but it is far from flawless. There are factual errors that should have...