Communication

COMMUNICATION To the Editor of Civil War History: In the March 1970 issue of Civil War History the very title of Albert Castel's article, "The Historian and the General; Thomas L. Connelly versus Robert E. Lee," establishes contradiction to the writer's dictum that "Lee need not be regarded as some sacrosanct saint on horseback." This contradiction is carried through the article. At its end the general is still the "preux chevalier, sans peur et sans reproche" of immaculate reputation in uniform. Mr. Castel makes me feel that I would be considered irreverent if I dared suppose that General Lee once allowed a drop of coffee to spot his uniform. The title seems designed to put the overwhelming reputation of General Lee against his puny adversary's as if to imply that the thought of such opposition would be ridiculous. I think it more appropriate to consider the issue as Thomas L. Connelly versus Albert Castel. This comes closer to the fact. As in most military conflicts, there are gains and losses on each side. Mr. Connelly's missiles, however, are uniformly projected directly at their targets, while some of Mr. Castel's seem to imbed themselves into the ground and throw dirt upon the opponent. Moreover, the tactics used appear to favor Mr. Connelly. His success need be only partial to be effective, but Mr. Castel's tactics demand that he rout his opponent completely in order to gain any victory at all. For he fails to concede a single point to Mr. Connelly except at the end to agree that the South would have fared better without Robert E. Lee—a very valid point, I believe, in Mr. Castel's sense and also in Mr. Connelly's. But he concedes this only to argue the opposite to Mr. Connelly: that the very ability and effectiveness of General Lee was the reason. Mr. Connelly established, in my opinion, several points which Mr. Castel either ignored or begged the question or failed to refute: 1.Ignored is Mr. Connelly's point that when Lee was asked to take command in the West he refused, giving as one reason that he would not have the high quality of subordinate generals that he had in the Army of Northern Virginia. This was an instance of the General's being concerned about Robert E. Lee. It is not only evidence that General Lee was human; it establishes a reason for his favoring Virginia. 2.Ignored to the extent of not facing it is the point of the relatively long supply lines essential to the Confederate operations in the West. Mr. Castel's only rejoinder is that it was tough, too, for the Union armies. True enough, but a Confederate general had to worry a lot more about maintaining his own supply lines than he could rejoice about his enemy's 171 172CIVIL WAR HISTORY trouble with logistics. General Bragg had to evacuate Chattanooga without firing a shot because of his supply line. Joe Johnston had likewise to retreat toward Atlanta before Sherman's flanking movements for the same reason. General Lee had the less unpleasant supply problem before Richmond. 3.Mr. Castel's bit of illogic prevents his refuting Mr. Connelly's argument that "to the Virginia convention he [Lee] declared his allegiance solely to the service of Virginia" on April 23, 1861. This was before Virginia was in the Confederacy, true, but barely so; did anybody have any reasonable doubt that she would be? And to prove that Lee expressed his allegiance to Virginia before his state was in the Confederacy is not to prove that he would not have said the same after Virginia joined. Mr. Castel might have argued that his hero served the Confederacy best by serving Virginia best within the state of Virginia (Lee's service on the southeastern coast of the Confederacy before the Seven Days affects that argument somewhat), but Mr. Castel did not choose to argue that way. 4.A question begged is that Lee's "penchant for the offensive" cost the Confederacy more than it could afford by causing "the South's largest field army" to bleed to death, and was "inconsistent with...