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book reviews269 Squall Across the Afantic: American Civil War Prize Cases and Diplomacy . By Stuart L. Bernath. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970. Pp. 170. $6.50.) The United States and France: Civil War Diplomacy. By Lynn M. Case and Warren F. Spencer. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970. Pp. 747. $22.50.) Stuart Bernath's study of the diplomatic and legal problems emanating from seizures of blockade runners during the American Civil War is the first objective, comprehensive work on the subject. It is written in plain, concise English and reads very well. Covered are cases involving the following ships: Amy Warwick, Blanche, Brilliante, Crenshaw, Dashing Wave, Emily Sr. Pierre, Hiawatha, Labuan, Magicienne, Margaret and Jessie, Matamoros, Mont Bhnc, Night Hawk, Peterhoff, Science, Sir William Peel, Springbok, Vohnte, and Will o' the Wisp. Other cases, such as those of the Dolphin and Thistle, receive passing mention. Bernath 's treatment of these cases is thorough and judicious, and his appraisal of their diplomatic consequences, in which he suggests that they "seriously aggravated Anglo-American relations," seems justified. His citations appear accurate and show extensive research in English and American archives. The chapter entitled "Great Britain Looks at the Prize Cases" provides a valuable analysis of British attitudes (mostly journalistic) on the subject. No serious student of Anglo-American relations during the Civil War period can afford not to give this book careful scrutiny. In his massive volume entitled Great Britain and the American Civil War, first published almost half a century ago, Ephraim D. Adams contributed what still remains the definitive study of Anglo-American relations during the Civil War period. Marred by clumsy writing and limited to the treatment, primarily, "of what the American Civil War meant to Great Britain," rather than representing an attempt objectively to survey Anglo-American relations from both the British and the American points of view, the Adams work is nevertheless based on extensive research in British sources and, along with Frank L. Owsley's King Cotton Diplomacy (a study of Confederate activity in Europe during the Civil War), it has been the foundation of almost everything else written about Civil War diplomacy by the entire current generation of historians. Now these two pioneer studies by Adams and Owsley are joined by a worthy companion — The United States and France: Civil War Diplomacy . Its principal author, Lynn M. Case, is already well known in the profession for his previous writings and for his salubrious influence on a group of talented younger historians, among them his associate in this particular work, Warren F. Spencer. Case and Spencer have done an enormous amount of research. The resulting book, unlike the Adams study, treats thoroughly both the French and the American aspects of Franco-American relations during the early 1860's. Moreover, Case and 270CIVIL WAR HISTORY Spencer seem more objective and their conclusions appear less dogmatic than those of either Adams or Owsley. The first several chapters of this book, covering much of the year 1861, are in my opinion weaker than the rest, largely because the judgments and interpretations in them appear to be based less on the author 's original research than on the work of older historians like Adams, Frederic Bancroft, and W. R. West. Much of the language seems extravagent. To say, for example (p. 67), that Mercier, the French Minister in Washington, went to the State Department "with fear and trembling ," and that in his "madness" Seward "tried to squirm out of an untenable position," while old world diplomatists shrank from this "enfant terrible," and huddled together "at the roar of Seward's cannon," appears as overstated as the declaration later on in the book (pp. 109 and 12325 ) that the British and French Ministers in Washington "were two very scared men, who scurried to their hiding places whenever the lion roared," despite the "clumsy" and "devious" maneuvers of the "explosive " Secretary of State. Case even invents a quotation to show Seward's "belligerence." Citing a private letter from the British Minister as his source, he asserts (p. 130) that "Seward shouted: 'Such recognition will mean war! The whole world will be engulfed and revolution will be the harvest.'" No such...

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