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358CIVIL WAR HISTORY and earlier works on Civil War railroads make that much apparent enough—but he suffered from flaws of personality and character which have to tlirow doubt on Lord's implication that he could have exercised higher military responsibility with success. Haupt scattered criticism of Union generalship promiscuously about him, but he diligently avoided any opportunity to test his constant suggestions that he was a better strategist and tactician than the men under whom he served. He also was clearly jealous of Daniel C. MeCallum's place in Union railroad management—a feeling which was reciprocated—but he replied to opportunities to rise above McCallum by insisting that he would have to remain free to return to Massachusetts to deal with the Hoosac Tunnel controversy whenever the need arose. Even within his more limited sphere as director of military railroads for the Department of the Rappahannock and eventually in Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania , he never formally accepted his brigadier general's commission lest he be impeded in going back to Massachusetts for his private business affairs when he wished. Thus, Haupt had strange ideas of the division between military and private responsibility. Despite his natural sympadiy for his protagonist, Lord throws more light on this aspect of the man than have previously published works. The book is not a conventional biography. It deals almost wholly with the period from April, 1862 to Haupt's departure from military service in September, 1863. There is little about any aspect of Haupt's earlier or subsequent career except the Hoosac Tunnel affair. In matters of literary style, the author badly needed careful editing which he did not get. Russell F. Weigi.ey Temple University Confederate Supply. By Richard D. Goff. (Durham: Duke Universitv Press, 1969. Pp. xii, 265. $8.75. ) For generations Civil War enthusiasts, especially those with southern sympathies, have accepted Robert E. Lee's statement about "overwhelming numbers and resources" as the happiest explanation for Confederate defeat. From birth most southerners are convinced that their section produces better fighters and juster causes—not slavery and secession but state sovereignty and the right of individual determination. Certain that they were on the righteous side of a just cause, and fundamentalist enough to believe that they enjoyed divine blessing, they were also convinced tiiat their generals were better trained and that the rural tradition of the South would stand their men in better stead for a field action. With such evidence demanding a Confederate victpry , a good, logical excuse was clearly needed to explain what had happened. And on the final day of significant action for the Confederacy 's most important army, its gentle, perfect knight offered up the perfect excuse—they were not outfought, but instead they had been book reviews359 outmanned, outproduced, outsupplied, and outdone. C. Vann Woodward has observed that the Confederates were the only Americans ever defeated, and so they are the only ones who have had to go through the humiliation of explaining, not just to themselves but also to their posterity , why they lost. Defeat is still defeat, and, as Richard Goff shows, they helped to defeat themselves. Goff has purposefully chosen to ignore other modern economic and logistical studies, except in the background sense, and has focused on "official" sources to study the evolution of Confederate supply problems . Public opinion is sampled where appropriate, but it is the records of the various supply departments and the correspondence of their various ohiefs that form the substance of his footnotes. By tracing the various bureau chiefs from appointment through replacement, he has lent a topical approach to what is really a chronological narrative. In this way problems are taken as they come and policies are evolved in first unhurried and finally in desperate attempts to overcome the South's supply problems. Goff is very successful in his method. Though he employs honored revisionist methods, his conclusions are traditional, even if reached through ultra-modern principles of measurement for military performance . For instance, he feels, as have many, that President Jefferson Davis was the South's greatest liability. Allowing "principles" to interfere with the business of running the war during the early years when victory was as...


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