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HOW THE NAPOLEON CAME TO AMERICA Stanley L. Falk If Union and Confederate soldiers ever had anything in common, then surely it must have been their mutual admiration and respect for that pesky half-ton of lethal ordnance known as the "Napoleon." This bronze, smoothbore artillery weapon, named for the French emperor—Napoleon III—who introduced it to Europe in the mid-1850's, was the most popular and effective field piece to see action in the Civil War. Praised by both Yankee and Rebel, by private as well as general, it was the deadly work-horse of gunners on both sides. Grant and his indefatigable chief of artillery, Henry J. Hunt, found it invaluable; Lee rated it as one of the best weapons for field service; and a veteran Confederate gunner summed up the universal esteem for the piece by boasting tiiat at the proper range he and his batterymates could outshoot even powerful rifled artillery "every time with our Napoleons."1 How did it happen that this French weapon, designed in Europe to meet the demands of Europe's wars,2 should find its greatest popularity and employment on American battiefields? How, indeed, did the Napoleon make its way across the Atlantic just in time to participate in the bloody conflict of die Civil War? The credit, if that is the proper word, must go to an American ordnance officer who recognized the value of the French field piece and, by extension, to the Secretary of War who made it possible for him to do so. In die first half of the nineteenth century, American advances in military technology, especially in artillery, to a large extent reflected prog1 Quoted in Fairfax Downey, "Artillery Forward!," Ordnance, XLV (1960), 213. For general appraisals of the Napoleon, including contemporary opinions, see ibid., 212-214; Jac Weiler, "The Field Artillery of the Civil War," Military Collector and Historian, V (1953), 29-32, 96; Henry J. Hunt, "Our Experiences in Artillery Administration," Journal of the Military Service Institute of the United States, XII ( 1891 ), 215; Jennings Cropper Wise, The Long Arm of Lee (Lynchburg, Va., 1915), I, 340-341; Military Commission to Europe in 1855 and 1856: Report of Major Alfred Mordecai (36 Cong., 1 sess., Senate Exec. Doc. No. 60, June 16, 1860), pp. 141-145 (hereafter cited as Mordecai Report). Descriptions and evaluations of the Napoleon in this article are based on the foregoing sources. 2 See also Morton Borden (ed.), "Friedrich Engles on Rifled Cannon," Military Affairs, XXI (1957), 76-77. 149 150CI VIL WAR HISTOR Y ress made in Europe. During this period, the War Department on several occasions had sent groups of officers, or individual officers, to observe and study European military developments. In the spring of 1855, dien, Secretary of War Jefferson Davis concluded that it would be profitable to dispatch anodier mission to Europe to collect information about "the military service in general, and especially the practical working of the changes which have been introduced of late years. . . ." The outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854, and the localizing of operations around Sevastopol in the fall of that year, presented an excellent opportunity to study die "practical working" of European military technology . With the approval of President Pierce, Davis selected three widely experienced and well-qualified army officers for the journey: Major Richard Delafield, the senior man, a veteran engineer and former superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy; Major Alfred Mordecai, a brilliant ordnance officer of long and valuable service; and Captain George B.McClellan , a gifted young cavalryman.3 The three officers left Washington in April, 1855, and were gone for a year. During this time tiiey traveled extensively through Europe, collecting an impressive amount of detailed, accurate, and highly valuable information about the armies, weapons, fortifications, and military resources of that continent. They returned widi an incredible quantity of knowledge and equipment acquired on tiieir journey, and each submitted a lengthy report of his observations and recommendations.4 The three men divided dieir subject fairly equally, in order to avoid overlap and repetition, and it was Major Mordecai, the ordnance officer , who was primarily concerned widi artillery developments. So it fell to his...

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