The Gleam of Bayonets: The Battle of Antietam and the Maryland Campaign of 1862 (review)

BOOKREVIEWS79 But all these points, as well as a minor error (the assertion that Buder failed of renomination in 1874), are unimportant shortcomings. What matters is that we have here a most enjoyable book, and it will not be necessary to have another biography of the general for many years to come. Hans L. Trefousse Brooklyn College The Gleam of Bayonets: The Battle of Antietam and the Maryland Campaign of 1862. By James V. Murfin. (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1965. Pp. 451. $12.00.) "Few battles in which Americans died have left such a mark on history as did Antietam," writes author James V. Murfin. Few battles have held in their final moments of victory and defeat the vast political , economic, and military implications that did this bloodiest single day of the Civil War. Antietam was the turning point in the history of the Confederacy; it was, diplomatically speaking, one of the decisive battles of the world; on it hinged the very existence of the United States. As James I. Robertson, Jr., says in his excellent introduction: 'Tactically, Antietam was a draw. Strategically, politically, diplomatically, and morally, it was a Union victory of high magnitude." On the credit side, this book shows rather wide consultation of sources, although the uncritical bibliography and notes (at the back of the book) reveal an ignorance of many significant studies—especially standard monographs and biographies. The volume is well illustrated with photographs and good maps (which, however, are too small), though there are no strategic maps and none for the crucial engagement of South Mountain. While the index is poor, the appendices and tables of organization are helpful. But the work's shortcomings bulk large. First, this reviewer has never seen such a miserably proofread book; it abounds in grammatical, spelling , and typographical errors. Then, Murfin's anti-McClellanism becomes almost a diatribe, where he cites hostile views against the general while suppressing contrary evidence that would tend to enhance McClellan 's accomplishments. For example, he states that "George B. McClellan was responsible for a major Federal military failure," whereas actually "Little Mac" won the Antietam campaign. The author contends, also erroneously, that McClellan's "lust for military power led the nation to the brink of disaster." He insists that "in every way the Maryland Campaign was [Lee's] show," but in his introduction Robertson says correctly that "the central figure at Antietam . . . is . . . McClellan." Nor is Murfin's stereotype of McClellan as a non-fighting, offensiveshunning commander true: the general did initiate the persistent assaults at South Mountain and Antietam. When the author speaks of McClellan's alleged "mismanagement of the Seven Days Battle," he overlooks Con- 80CIVIL WARHISTORY federate General D. H. Hill's acknowledgment that "throughout this campaign we attacked just when and where the enemy wished us to attack." Murfin is unconvincing, too, when he claims that McClellan was given proper orders to assume command of the Union field army to pursue Lee in western Maryland and bring him to open battle, and he ignores the unfortunate conflicting orders from Lincoln and Halleck to McClellan. It is also incorrect to have the southern ironclad Virginia threatening Washington in September, 1862; this was in March of that year. Too much is made of McClellan's coming into possession of the famous Confederate "Lost Order" No. 191; the northern commander had already , through his cavalry reconnaissances, diagnosed Lee's intentions and routes of march. A further serious flaw is the author's occasional attempts to tell the reader what persons were thinking at a given moment in the past. And while Murfin goes into considerable detail in describing the battles of the Maryland campaign, the descriptions are at times unclear and lacking in precision and balance. Furthermore, it is a gross mistake to claim that Lee had "about 35,255" effectives on the morning of September 17, 1862, as compared with McClellan's alleged 87,164; the comparative numbers were much closer. Murfin does admit, however, that if Bumside had attacked the Confederate right at Antietam as ordered by McClellan, "Lee would most assuredly have been overwhelmingly defeated ." The author holds that "Lee had beaten off each of the Federal attacks"; but...