Seeking Something Bigger than Balance in Cross-Strait Relations

[ 10 ] asia policy Seeking Something Bigger than Balance in Cross-Strait Relations Jianwei Wang With regard to maintaining a “healthy balance” across the Taiwan Strait, an interesting debate has taken place recently among U.S. specialists on Taiwan. Robert Sutter has argued that the long-standing U.S. policy goal is to maintain “a balance of power and influence in the Taiwan area favorable to Taiwan and U.S. interests and influenced by the United States.”1 This balance has been eroded since Ma Ying-jeou came to power in Taiwan last May. Richard Bush and Alan Romberg have disagreed, however, pointing out that the goal of the United States regarding the Taiwan Strait over the last 50 years “has been the maintenance of peace and stability in the Strait.”2 Maintaining a balance of power and influence is a means rather than an end. In a sense, both positions are right. Even as maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is a long-term and broad goal of U.S. policy, sustaining a balance of power and influence is very often Washington’s short-term objective. As Hans Morgenthau once said, whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim.3 Therefore, maintaining a healthy balance across the Taiwan Strait could be a U.S. policy objective, as President Barack Obama implied in his remarks on arms sales to Taiwan last August during the presidential campaign. The real questions, however, are what kind of balance Washington is seeking and whether such balance per se is sufficient to sustain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. These are not simple and easy questions to answer. To begin with, maintaining a balance of power between China and Taiwan is quite literally a “mission impossible.” This relationship is asymmetric in nature due to the critical mass of mainland China. The United States often justifies the sale of weapons to Taiwan as necessary for maintaining military balance across the strait. In reality, unless the United States is willing to sell massive amounts 1 Robert Sutter, “Cross-Strait Moderation and the United States—Policy Adjustments Needed,” Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies, PacNet Newsletter, no. 17, March 5, 2009. 2 Richard Bush and Alan Romberg, “Cross-Strait Moderation and the United States—A Response to Robert Sutter,” Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies, PacNet Newsletter, no. 17A, March 12, 2009. 3 Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), 25. jianwei wang is Eugene Katz Letters and Science Distinguished Professor of Political Science at University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point and Senior Research Associate at the Shanghai Association of American Studies and Shanghai Center for RimPac Strategic and International Studies. He can be reached at . [ 11 ] roundtable • defining a healthy balance of advanced weapons to Taiwan, arms sales cannot keep pace with mainland China’s steadily increasing military prowess. In a way, arms sales are more symbolic, demonstrating Washington’s commitment to Taiwan’s security. It is the unwritten but well-understood commitment of the United States to defending Taiwan against military attack from the mainland that has helped create a sense of balance in cross-strait relations. The military balance between Taiwan and the mainland, therefore, is only credible if the U.S. military is included in the equation. That is how the United States has played the role of a balancer in cross-strait relations over the past three decades. The possibility of U.S. military intervention is what has given Beijing pause when considering whether to use force against perceived movement toward Taiwanese independence. Therefore, arms sales alone cannot constitute a healthy balance across the Taiwan Strait. At most, what arms sales can accomplish is to slow to some degree the growing imbalance between Taiwan and the mainland. From this perspective, a healthy balance across the Taiwan Strait cannot be purely understood in military terms. Indeed, what occupied the United States in the last eight years during Chen Shui-bian’s tenure was more political than military balancing. The Bush administration made it clear that Washington opposes “any unilateral decision by either China or...