The C.S.S. Florida: Her Building and Operations (review)

418CIVIL WAR HISTORY Lincoln, in the process of resolving his psychological problems, developed "the most salutory understanding in history of human nature, human relations, and social organization," a philosophy "far more fundamental than Freud's theory of mental development and social organization through repression of forbidden sexual desires." A genius, Lincoln was a hundred years ahead of his time in thinking that physical constitution and environmental situation together determined human behavior and in recognizing the value of occupational therapy in treating mental patients—ideas that actually were common among enlightened physicians and laymen in the 1840's. Even for such a remarkable man as Kempf depicts, the hundreds of pages of quotations from his speeches seem excessive. Parsimony here and otherwise, along with the elimination of repetition, might have reduced this work to one volume, all that is probably necessary. Except for an occasional lapse, the writing is clear and free from jargon. It is unfortunate that in such an unusual interpretation the bibliography should be sparse and important citations sometimes lacking in the text. If the origin and nature of Lincoln's personality remain largely conjecture even after such extensive analysis, KempPs fifty years of clinical and research experience in psychiatry are not to be denied, and these volumes abound in penetrating if not impregnable insights. The main difficulty is that the available evidence and perhaps the existing personality theories are inadequate for the author's purposes. Norman Dain Rutgers, The State University The C.S.S. Florida: Her Building and Operations. By Frank Lawrence Owsley, Jr. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1965. Pp. 208. $6.00.) Believing that Civil War historians have largely neglected the significance of commerce raiding, or "naval guerrilla warfare," as he terms it, the author of this litde volume presents an account of the exploits of the C.S.S. Florida, second in importance among the Confederate raiders. Owsley 's evaluation of the raiders as a group is well taken. They captured some two hundred merchantmen, frightened others into staying in port, caused panic along the North Atlantic seaboard, added to the general war-weariness in the North, and drew Union warships away from blockade duty. The Florida's part in effecting this damage was important, as Owsley shows. She captured thirty-eight prizes, several of which her crew converted into additional raiders so as to take a still greater toll of Union commerce. In total monetary value the Florida's "take" was second only to that of her better-known sister, the Alabama. Because Owsley has important points to make, it is especially sad that the book does not read well. His prose is laborious and heavy; the endless captures are each dutifully recorded in catalog fashion with the same BOOK REVIEWS419 details being repeated, often in the same words, for each incident All the necessary ingredients of good drama are present, but Owsley's somber, mechanical treatment removes most of the color. Owsley deals with technical points of international law in such a way that the inexpert reader might easily be confused or misled. For example, he refers several times to northern anger over the Florida's displaying the British ensign as a ruse so she could approach Union merchantmen close enough to capture them. Since he eschews a discussion of international law on the point, the reader is left either confused or believing that the action was illegal. Actually, I can find no evidence that international law specifically forbade such a trick, nor does it appear that in negotiating the Treaty of Washington in 1871 the United States sought to convince Britain of its illegality. In fact, in an 1817 admiralty case the United States Supreme Court upheld the flying of false colors as a ruse. Some readers will question Owsley's evaluation of the Florida's first skipper , John N. Maffitt, which is perplexing at best, and his comparison of Maffitt with Charles M. Morris, his replacement. On p. 35 Owsley says it "seems probable" that if the Florida had been under Maffitt during her whole career she would have been better known than the Alabama; on p. 136 the author doubts that Maffitt would have had a much better...