The "Right Size" for China's Military: To What Ends?

[ 57 ] roundtable • sizing the chinese military The “Right Size” for China’s Military: To What Ends? Ellis Joffe How much is enough for China’s military? As the People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to build up China’s armed forces, this question has become a source of concern to U.S. policymakers and military officials. Most think that the PRC has gone far enough—that the build-up has gone beyond China’s defense needs and is beginning to constitute a threat to U.S. forces operating in the region. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has characterized China’s military build-up as “outsized for its regional interests.” But what are these interests, and what is the “right size” for China’s military? The Taiwan Issue Most analysts of Chinese military affairs agree that the purpose of China’s military build-up during the past decade or so has been to acquire a capability that would enable China either to coerce Taiwan into accepting a “one China” solution to the Taiwan problem, or at least to prevent Taiwan from moving toward formal independent status. Although China’s post-Mao military modernization was driven by several factors, the chief reason for the accelerated build-up that began in the mid-1990s and increased after 1999 was the emergence of the Taiwan issue in a form that threatened the “one China” solution and was unacceptable to the Chinese. By2007theoverwhelmingsignificanceoftheTaiwanissuehasdiminished dramatically, primarily because the specter of a major war no longer hovers over the Taiwan Strait, even if it has not disappeared. Why then is the PRC continuing to build up the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)? The objectives driving this build-up go far beyond the Taiwan issue. Any attempt to assess what the PRC considers the “right size” for China’s armed forces must begin with a look at these objectives.  Joel Brinkley, “Rice Warns China to Make Major Economic Changes,” New York Times (Late Edition), Aug 19, 2005, A10. Ellis Joffe is Professor Emeritus of International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He has written widely on the People’s Liberation Army. He can be reached at . note u This essay is a shortened version of a paper originally presented at the conference “Exploring the ‘Right Size’ for China’s Military: PLA Missions, Functions, and Organization,” Carlisle Barracks, PA, October 6–8, 2006 and to be included in Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell, eds., Right Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military (Carlisle, PA: Army War College Press, forthcoming).The essay reflects the views of the author and may not reflect those of the National Defense University or any other agency of the United States government. [ 58 ] asia policy To Make China a Great Power The most basic, long-range, and unalterable objective of the Chinese leadership has been both to obtain recognition for China as a great power and to gain from the other great powers the respect and standing that come with this status. Anchored in China’s physical attributes (territory, population, and geographical location) and driven by nationalistic impulses, this objective gained a tremendous push in recent years from the economic surge that catapulted China to the front rank of the global economy and a position of major political influence. This economic boom also provided China with the economic strength that constitutes one of the two essential pillars of greatpower status. The other pillar—military force—is nowhere near a level that is commensurate with great-power status. At a minimum, such status would presumably require forces that include not only aircraft carriers, long-range aircraft, transport aircraft and ships for moving large numbers of troops and supplies but also air and sea refueling capabilities, global communications systems, and bases in friendly countries. Although working to develop some of these capabilities, China still lacks most of them. Aware that a full array of such capabilities will be out of China’s reach for generations, China’s leaders have never set achieving these capabilities as a realistic objective. Since Beijing’s global aspirations represent a political and emotional rather than a strategic goal, China’s leadership has not perceived...