PLA Ground Force Modernization Underway in All Military Regions, Preparing for a Variety of Missions

[ 78 ] asia policy PLA Ground Force Modernization Underway in All Military Regions, Preparing for a Variety of Missions Dennis J. Blasko The 2004 Chinese defense white paper acknowledged that priority has been given to the navy, air force, and Second Artillery force to strengthen the “comprehensive deterrence and warfighting capabilities” of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—a fact that has been apparent to foreign analysts for about a decade. Despite the precedence given to the other services, ground forces (army) still comprise the vast majority of the PLA. While the Chinese government has not provided an official accounting of the personnel distribution within the 2.3 million-strong active-duty PLA, most estimates usually credit the army with about 1.6 million personnel (about 69% of the force), the navy with about 255,000 (about 11%), the air force with some 400,000 (about 17%), and the Second Artillery with around 100,000 (about 4%). Moreover, though the PLA’s leadership structure is changing gradually, ground force officers continue to retain the majority of leadership positions from headquarters in Beijing down to the local levels. Although the army is sometimes overlooked when outsiders concentrate on high-technology developments in the PLA, modernization of the ground force is an integral element of the long-term transformation of China’s armed forces. As the PLA explores more maritime-oriented missions for the 21st century, the army is building forces to maintain its relevance to China’s overall deterrence posture and to PLA warfighting capabilities. This essay provides a brief overview of this ground force modernization.  Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in 2004 (Beijing, December 27, 2004) u http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/ natdef2004.html.  International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2006 (London: Routledge, 2006), 264. Dennis J. Blasko is an independent consultant who served 23 years in the U.S. Army as Military Intelligence Officer and Foreign Area Officer specializing in China. note u This essay updates information found in the author’s book, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century (London: Routledge, 2006). This essay is a shortened version of a paper originally presented at the conference “Exploring the ‘Right Size’ for China’s Military: PLA Missions, Functions, and Organization,” Carlisle Barracks, PA, October 6–8, 2006 and to be included in Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell, eds., Right Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military (Carlisle, PA: Army War College Press, forthcoming). [ 79 ] roundtable • sizing the chinese military Political Loyalty A fundamental underpinning of PLA modernization is the political loyalty of the PLA to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In the mindset of the CCP, national survival is equivalent to the survival of the party. The PLA political officer system and party committee system are principally responsible for maintaining ideological correctness and political obedience within the military. When technological capabilities are lacking, the PLA sees its political system as adding ideological strength to the balance of power equation. Fear of chaos and the belief that the CCP and Chinese armed forces are the ultimate protectors against turmoil breaking out throughout the country likely motivate the vast majority of PLA personnel to remain loyal to the party. Fragile domestic conditions emphasize the need to carefully coordinate and balance military modernization with other aspects of national economic development. In such an environment, the military recognizes the need both to share resources with other national requirements and to join the rest of the country in supporting the national economy. Organizational Missions Within this political framework, the armed forces of China have both external and internal missions. The PLA primarily is focused outward, the People’s Armed Police (PAP) is focused domestically, and the militia provides general support. Military planning and training for potential Taiwan contingencies is high on the PLA’s list, with training for this mission undertaken mostly in the Nanjing, Guangzhou, and Jinan Military Regions. Nonetheless, the army also trains for many additional missions throughout the country, including preparation for a variety of nontraditional security threats. In a major change to Chinese policy...