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CONFEDERATE NAVAL POLICY AND THE IRONCLAD William N. SM, Jr. During the course of the Civil War die Confederate government constructed or contracted for fifty or more ironclad warships to be built within die Confederacy. Of diis number, twenty-one were commissioned and placed in operation. Stephen R. Mallory, Confederate Secretary of the Navy, and many of his officers considered die armored ship to be die most significant element of die Confederate naval program . For that reason an examination of the development of policy regarding die ironclads is essential in order to understand the overall Confederate naval effort. On July 11, 1861, Mallory held a conference with diree of his staff. At the end of diis meeting, he wrote out an order to Flag Officer French Forrest, commandant of die Gosport Navy Yard, Norfolk, Virginia, and handed it to one of die officers present. The order read: "You will proceed with all practicable dispatch to make die changes in die Merrimac . . . according to the designs and plans of die constructor and engineer, Messrs. Porter and Williamson." This order initiated die construction of ironclad vessels-of-war within die Confederacy.1 Mallory's decision to build an armored warship was not particularly surprising. By the beginning of die Civil War, European maritime powers were well aware of the significance of diis technological revolution in naval warfare. Both England and France possessed ironclads, and odier European nations had considered adding one or more to their fleets. In the United States die importance of the ironclad had been recognized for a number of years, and one was even under conWilliam N. Still, Jb., assistant professor of history at Mississippi State College for Women, is completing a full-length study of Confederate ironclads. He gratefully acknowledges financial aid from his college which allowed him to finish the research for this article. ? Southern Historical Society Papers (Richmond, 1876-1930), XIX, 12-13; J. W. H. Porter, A Record of Events in Norfolk County, Virginia (Portsmouth, Va., 1892), p. 334. Conversion of the Enoch Train into the Manassas began in Apr., 1861, but this ironclad was designed as a privateer, not a warship. 145 146WILLIAMN. STILL, JR. struction. This vessel, however, was still on the stocks when war broke out.2 The Civil War became a testing ground for many new developments in military technology, including die ironclad ship. Botii the Union and Confederate governments emphasized die construction of armored vessels during the war, although die Confederates took the first step. It was only logical that die Soudierners, widiout a navy and widiout die potential to keep pace widi dieir opponents in building vessels-ofwar , would experiment witii new types of ships. Of diese die most successful was die ironclad. This development, however, was not foreseen when the naval committee of die provisional Congress met early in February, 1861. In fact at that time—prior to actual hostilities—die Confederate Congress concerned itself primarily with creating a small naval auxiliary force to cooperate with die army. Nevertheless, it did recommend the organization of a Navy Department, which was accomplished on February 21, 1861. Shortly afterward, Jefferson Davis appointed Mallory as Secretary of the newly-created bureau. Mallory was perhaps as well qualified as most appointees to Confederate cabinet positions—the essential prerequisite being a certain amount of administrative ability. He certainly had diat, plus a limited knowledge of naval affairs acquired when he served as chairman of the United States Senate Naval Affairs Committee.3 When Mallory reached Montgomery, Alabama, where the new government was convening, he became aware of the fact diat he was a naval secretary without a navy. Of die ninety ships in die U.S. Navy at die time of President Abraham Lincoln's inauguration (of which forty-two were in commission), only one, the Fulton, laid up at Pensacola , was seized by die Soudierners. Apparendy, die lack of ships was not die most pressing problem to Mallory; diis would come widi die Sumter crisis and die opening of hostilities. He was most concerned with organizing his department and finding assignments for the more than two hundred former U.S. naval officers who had resigned their commissions by March, 1861. The supply...

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