Abstract

The present study is the first to examine the Beckettian representation of time in relation to the conceptual complexity of time itself — the cluster of concepts informing the idea of time, philosophically construed. There is no consistency in the representation of time in the Beckettian opus. For fundamentally time is relegated to the status of illusion, as the driving aim of Beckettian texts is to express an abiding mentality or attitude toward experience which does not change and remains impervious to local circumstance. At bottom, the Beckettian attitude toward experience construes awareness in terms of the unremittingly uniform unpleasantness of suffering it. In contrast to the Kantian dispensation, in Beckettian mimesis time is not a condition preceding experience, but a conclusion drawn from experience and a means of expressing that experience. Analysis of the diverse and complex Beckettian constructions of time enables deeper understanding of the texts in which they occur.

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