Confederate Strategy from Shiloh to Vicksburg (review)

Book Reviews211 Confederate Strategy from Shihh to Vicksburg. By Archer Jones. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1960. Pp. 258. $5.00.) The centennial anniversary of the Civil War has, naturally enough, precipitated a veritable avalanche of books about the war. Unfortunately, some of these books have been mediocre (or, far too often, sub-mediocre) in quality —reprints of books already in print, biographies of obscure individuals, labored discussions of trivial details of battles or campaigns, valiant destruction of straw men, ponderous threshing over of old straw, etc., etc. This being true, it is all the more pleasant to read and review a book such as Dr. Jones has written, approaching one of the basic aspects of the war from an angle which has not attracted the attention of many writers and providing a penetrating analysis of a fundamental factor bearing on the conduct of the war. The overall strategy of the Confederates, as Dr. Jones points out in his opening chapter, "was based on territorial defense, not only for political and social motives, but for sound logistical reasons"; and he shows how this concept affected the thinking and action of the Confederate leaders. Dr. Jones writes from a calmly objective point of view, but he is definitely of the opinion that the West was the really decisive theater of the war, where "the decisive blows were struck," and he is sharply critical of the policy of the Richmond authorities in neglecting the West while maintaining an unnecessarily large proportion of their armed manpower in Virginia. "They would have done better," he says, "to spare some of their strength to bolster the sagging West, where the war was being lost." Dr. Jones is particularly impressive in his dispassionate discussion of the relations between President Jefferson Davis and General Joseph E. Johnston. Too often, it has seemed, writers attempting to defend either of these two Confederate leaders have thought it necessary to enhance the glory and reputation of the one by attacking the wisdom or ability of the other. As few writers have done so effectively, Dr. Jones fairly analyzes and evaluates the virtues and the shortcomings of both. The friction that developed between them after Johnston was put in charge of the Department of the West in late 1862, Dr. Jones believes, was due to a fundamental difference in strategic concept: "one stressing vital points and the other regarding the army as the means to the objective of preventing the severance of the Confederacy." Summarizing his conclusions, Dr. Jones says: "Confederate strategy, territorially and IogisticaUy oriented, seems realistic and adapted to conditions. Its implementation dirough a decentralized command system was wise, and the measure of central control was adequate. Davis and his War Secretaries bear scrutiny well. While genius was absent, ability and insight were demonstrated ." Stanley F. Horn Nashville, Tennessee ...