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The Journal of Military History 67.2 (2003) 597-598



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Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War, 1939-40. Edited by Alexander O. Chubaryan and Harold Shukman. Portland, Oreg.: Frank Cass, 2002. ISBN 0-7146-5203-2. Maps. Photographs. Notes. Appendix. Index. Pp. xxvi, 301. $80.00.
Finland in the Second World War: Between Germany and Russia. By Olli Vehviläinen. New York: Palgrave, 2002. ISBN 0-333-80149-0. Maps. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. x, 199. $65.00.

Finland's struggle against the Soviet Union during World War II insured the small nation's entry into history's pantheon of romantic "lost causes." There are works in English on the contest, most notably Alan Chew's The White Death. But the lack of access to Russian archives, and the linguistic challenges of research in Helsinki, have insured that the Soviet-Finnish relationship has received scant attention. Fortunately, these two works excel at shedding new light on the Russo-Finnish War (Winter War) of 1939-40, and the "Continuation War" (as the Finns call it) of 1941-44.

Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War, 1939-40 is a fascinating translation of the transcript of the meetings of the "Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)" from 14 to 17 April 1940. The editors contend, correctly, that this work offers a "valuable source for the study of international relations and the history of the Soviet Union." Soviet military leaders provided surprising and often lucid assessments of the failings of their military forces during the "Winter War." There is much "Bolshevik self-criticism," occasional "buck passing," and a few amusing efforts on the part of participants to quickly push on to other subjects when Stalin cast a scrutinizing eye on the roles of individuals involved in the debacle. What clearly emerges is that the Soviet forces paid the price for the poor and inadequate training that existed across the entire spectrum of their military hierarchy. Many soldiers did not even know how to use basic equipment, particularly indispensable heavy weapons like mortars and machineguns. Coordination between air and ground forces was laughable, logistics were horribly mismanaged, and Soviet staffs distinguished themselves by their incompetence. Moreover, many of the Soviet units were fed piecemeal into the invasion, hence failing to take proper advantage of the Red Army's overwhelming strength. The reader is presented with the visage of an army crippled by poor training and appalling leadership. [End Page 597]

Finland in the Second World War covers Finland's relations with Germany and the Soviet Union from Finland's birth during World War I to 1948. The book's primary focus is on Helsinki's political dealings with Berlin and Moscow during the Second World War. Unfortunately, Vehviläinen, Professor Emeritus of History at the University of Tampere, and the editor of a number of works on Finland and the Second World War, neglects the military activities of Finland's armed forces during the "Continuation War" of 1941- 45. But he does supply a fine, informed study of the international dimension of Finland's war as the tiny nation successfully maneuvered through the political "no-man's land" of World War II Europe. Vehviläinen combines an excellent synthesis of the Scandinavian literature on Finland's diplomatic dilemma, with material mined from archives in Helsinki, Moscow, and Stockholm. He outlines Finland's diplomatic success at escaping the rapacious grasp of the Soviet Union and that of an equally imperious Nazi Germany. Helsinki purchased its diplomatic victory through the tenacity of its army, which, with German help, managed to stop a 1944 Soviet offensive against Finland, and the adroitness of its diplomats. Military and political success allowed the Finns to escape the postwar retribution that Stalin meted out to Germany's other "collaborationist" powers.

But bits of Vehviläinen's argument appear weak, particularly in our post-Cold War world. Surprisingly, he buys into Stalin's argument that the U.S.S.R.'s territorial demands were "strategically justified" (p...

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