Anglo-French Defence Relations Between the Wars (review)

The theme of Anglo-French relations never ceases to fascinate English-speaking scholars. It appears to be of somewhat less interest to the French. A possible explanation of the phenomenon follows from three facts: (1) an innate security the French feel about their place in Europe; (2) the perpetual British inquiry into their relationship to Europe; and (3) the continuing strong British and North American attraction to the rich depositories of diplomatic and military papers for study of Franco-British encounters in the twentieth century. By and large, French academics do not haunt British (or American) archives in the manner of the "Anglo-Saxons" thronging French archives. Not surprisingly, studies in this field were for many years principally drawn (partly for lack of archival access in France) from British sources. Very often, they reflected a largely British angle of vision. This limitation no longer stands, though elements of the Anglocentric approach persist and are illustrated, here and there, even in this excellent book.

Written by British, Canadian, and American experts on the interwar moment, most of these studies are firmly anchored in the public papers of the two nations. Dramatic new conclusions? Mostly, no. Fresh evidence? Very often, yes. A step forward generally in examination of the defence relationship? Certainly. As always, much of the interest lies in the detail. A spirited introduction announces and connects the individual themes. Some of these are treated, it must be said, so broadly, or have been so long and so much a part of the contemporary public record, that a substantial advance on what was known at the time is not easily shown. Anthony Clayton's discussion of Royal Navy-Marine Nationale relations is a case in point. Reynolds Salerno's account of conflicting Anglo-French reactions to Mussolini is perhaps less novel than he suggests, though well buttressed by reference to the literature and public documents. Andrew Webster's informed reflections on the interminably discouraging disarmament and arms limitation wrangling, 1920-36, could lead one to conclude that it is destined to torture historians as unrewardingly as it tormented contemporaries. Some essays impress by the ingenuity of their theses. Talbot Imlay's forceful reconsideration of the Franco-British run-up to war seeks to show (contrary to received opinion) that it was the French who set the pace, if not the entire agenda, 1938-39. Arguable this may be, but it is a closely documented and stimulating contribution. As much may be said of Peter Jackson and Joseph Maiolo's deeply informed account of Franco-British intelligence operations before the war. An admirably rigorous command of sources is shown in Martin Thomas's illuminating paper on Franco-British difficulties in the Mediterranean. Martin Alexander argues fairly for a certain limited Anglo-French success in Franco-British economic cooperation, 1937-40. William Philpott's brief account of the Supreme War Council, 1939-40, considers even-handedly the halting first steps of an inter-allied institution suddenly extinguished before it was clear what it might become.

Papers so brief obviously deny their authors the luxury of revealing much of the human factor at play. Inevitably, a summary, even compacted, nature characterizes many of these essays, drawing on a mass of mostly official evidence. Understandably, the actors in these Anglo-French encounters are no more than dimly perceived. These are papers for a scholarly audience, and none the worse for that. Elsewhere, of course, in more spacious publications, the men behind the official documents will need bringing back to the surface of things; and their various qualities, motives, weights, and interactions re-assessing. Overall, the editors make a case that, despite the disagreements and unresolved problems of these Franco-British exercises, the potential for fruitful Franco-British defence cooperation existed. Hidden by prewar controversy and the subsequent collapse of...