Patton's Air Force: Forging a Legendary Air-Ground Team (review)

From August 1944 until May 1945, George S. Patton's Third Army received the dedicated support of Otto P. Weyland's XIX Tactical Air Command (TAC). This account demonstrates that the XIX TAC contributed materially to the Third Army's success in World War II. The air-ground teamwork that flowed from the mutual respect and admiration for one another of Patton and Weyland helped secure victory. Written from a command perspective, this case study of tactical air power is solidly based on primary sources, including unit histories, official reports, and diaries.

The Army Air Forces experience in North Africa contributed to the XIX TAC's effective operation. Air doctrine revised in 1943 declared that an air commander should be co-equal with the ground commander and control tactical missions. In order of importance, the missions were air superiority, battlefield interdiction, and close air support. Pragmatic Brigadier General Weyland, much to Patton's delight, made close air support of ground units a first priority but managed to complete the other missions as well. North Africa also demonstrated that a TAC should consist of a proper mix of fighter, fighter-bomber, night fighter, and photo-reconnaissance units.

Weyland's squadrons greatly aided Patton's dash across France. They flew armed reconnaissance over Patton's armored spearheads, a practice air doctrine purists disliked. They also guarded Patton's open right flank along the Loire, allowing him to beef up his attacking units. The Third Army moved so fast across France that Weyland was hard pressed to construct new airfields and maintain communications between his headquarters echelons. The long distances forced him to decentralize control but to locate his advanced headquarters next to army headquarters where Patton and Weyland planned operations together.

Patton's drive bogged down in Lorraine, but the static front enabled Weyland to develop navigational radar, support a Saar River crossing, and suppress the Luftwaffe. Around Metz, Weyland discovered that tactical air could not destroy hardened fortifications. The XIX TAC's location in eastern France enabled it to counter the German advance around Bastogne. Weyland's men flew varied missions to help blunt the German attack.

Once across the Rhine, Weyland moved his airfields first around Frankfurt and then Nuremberg, enabling his men to help destroy the Luftwaffe while continuing close air support.

The success of this air-ground collaboration Spires attributes largely to the good personal and professional relations between Patton and Weyland and their staffs. This is an area that needs more examination. This study could also benefit from more coverage of the human dimension of tactical air warfare.

Military professionals and students of military history will find this monograph of great interest.