Abstract

The American air campaign against Hanoi in 1967 pushed Vietnamese air defenses to the brink of disaster. By the spring of 1967, continued improvements in U.S. tactics and electronic warfare technology had rendered North Vietnam's SA-2 missiles and radar-controlled anti-aircraft guns virtually impotent against U.S. Air Force aircraft. The Vietnamese were able to rise from the ashes of this potential defeat through intense political indoctrination; research and training; adjustments in the missions and deployment of North Vietnam's missile, anti-aircraft, and fighter units; assistance from communist allies; and American hesitancy and miscalculation.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1543-7795
Print ISSN
0899-3718
Pages
pp. 175-200
Launched on MUSE
2003-04-03
Open Access
No
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