War and Memory in Lebanon (review)

In War and Memory in Lebanon, Sune Haugbolle explores how Lebanese society has coped with the memory of the civil war (1975-1990) from the conflict's termination to the "Independence Intifada" following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri on February 14, 2005. In the years after the end of the conflict, many Lebanese have avoided an open discussion of it, leading a prominent Lebanese sociologist, Samir Khalaf, to speak of a "collective amnesia" in this regard.¹ However, and as noted by previous works, this policy of silence, which was adhered to by the state and by most political leaders in postwar Lebanon (many of whom owed their positions to their roles as militia leaders during the war), was, in effect, selective in two crucial respects: first, only some Lebanese have ignored the war; second, those who discussed it openly have done so in a partial and indeed ambiguous way.

The book presents a critical reading of the war-related discourse in Lebanon, focusing on several major topics, such as the reconstruction of Beirut in the 1990s and the debate that it elicited; the nostalgia for prewar Lebanon; and the way that the violence of the conflict was addressed. In each of these areas, the author employs numerous primary sources including novels, newspapers, magazines, cartoons, films, television programs, graffiti, plays and popular songs. While some of these sources have been tapped by previous works, combining them allows for a deep probe into the postwar discourse which, occasionally, yields interesting insights.

Although the book's main emphasis is sociological, it would be of interest also to political scientists and to historians of Lebanon and the Middle East. Among the latter, it would appeal especially to those interested in the possibilities and limitations facing civil society groups in Middle Eastern countries. At the same time, the book adds to the debate concerning the role of civil society in post-conflict situations, and in particular regarding "the possibilities and complications that truth telling outside a sanctioned, national space involves" (p. 194). That said, readers who are not familiar with Lebanese history, politics, and society may find it difficult to follow all of the events and the actors mentioned in the book; perhaps a more general introductory chapter (or a glossary) would have been helpful to them.

Although the book certainly adds to our understanding of Lebanon, some of its claims are unconvincing. First, the role of the state in Lebanon (and elsewhere in the region), is by no means "marginal," including in the realm of "memorialisation" (p. 6, n. 1). In fact, some of the state-sponsored narratives of the war, such as the claim that it was, essentially, a "war of others" (i.e., of foreign actors, both state and non-state) have had an impact on in its civil society. Second, and in the same vein, the threat posed to the state itself (and not merely to its political leaders) by "mentioning" the war, which induced the policy of state-sponsored silence, is not explained. Third, the book does not mention that some Lebanese factions invited these external forces (both state and non-state) to intervene in the conflict, leading to its "internationalization," and that the claim regarding a "war of others" in Lebanon is, hence, an attempt to silence this role. Finally, the book does not emphasize enough that the discourse regarding the conflict was very political indeed: it was a way of criticizing the political, social, and economic order in postwar Lebanon, including Syria's hegemonic role there, in an indirect manner.

Finally, the book contains several factual errors. First, the civil war ended on October 13, 1990, and not in November 1990 (p. 15). Second, Bechara al-Khuri was President of Lebanon in the period 1943-1952 and Camille Chamoun was President in 1952-1958, and not as stated (p. 40). Third, the presidential terms of Frangieh, Chehab, and Helou are stated incorrectly (p. 165). Fourth...