Moving Beyond the OB Markers: Rethinking the Space of Civil Society in Singapore

SOJOURN Vol. 20, No. 2 (2005), pp. 1 19-31 Moving Beyond the OB Markers: Rethinking the Space of CivilSociety in Singapore In January 2004, prior to his appointment as Singapore's third Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong gave a landmark speech to the Harvard Club ofSingapore in which he outlined a new style ofstate-society relations. Claiming that "I have no doubt that our society must open up further", Lee emphasized that one ofthe important tasks facing the government was to "promote further civic participation, and continue to progressively widen the limits of openness" (Lee 2004). In his comments, Lee sought to signal a break between the ruling style of former Prime Minister Goh ChokTong, and himself.1 In light of Lee Hsien Loong's claims that under his leadership Singapore will experience greater "openness", it is timely to reflect back on the nature of civil society under his predecessor. This collection ofpapers contributes to that understanding bybringing together a diverse number ofcase studies ofcivil societyactivism in Singapore during the latteryears ofGoh Chok Tong's rule. By drawing on in-depth research of non-government organizations (NGOs) and other civil society actors, these papers not only provide nuanced understandings of specific organizations and activist groups, but also broaden the terms ofscholarly debate about the nature ofstate-civil society relations in Singapore. Civil Society in Singapore Civil society in Singapore has been the source ofconsiderable scholarly interest. Much ofthis work has focused on the dominant role played by the ruling elite ofthe People's Action Party (PAP) in both opening up and closing down spaces for civil society engagement (see, for example, 120Lenore LYONS and James GOMEZ Chua 1995, 2000; Rodan 1996a, 1996b). Numerous writers have documented the authoritarianism of the Singapore state (see Rodan 1993, 1996a, 1996b; Haas 1989; Khong 1995; Singh 1992). This has led some commentators to conclude that despite a parliament modelled on Westminster-style democracy, the PAP has effectively testricted the growth ofa participatory parliamentary system, and instead fostered a "mass society" characterized by a lack of political institutions between the state and the people, that is, that Singapore lacks an effective "civil society" (Haas 19819; Tamney 1996). More recently, Garry Rodan (2003, p. 505) has argued that Singapore exhibits "civil society forces" rather than genuine civil society. Many scholars agree, however, that civil society in Singapore is largely a state-sanctioned sphere of engagement that has emerged in response to middle class pressure for greater political liberalization (Brown and Jones 1995; Koh and Ooi 2000; Rodan 1996a, 1996b). Goh Chok Tongs period as Prime Minister is characterized by an easing of overt forms ofsocial and political control in favour ofa model ofconsensus and consultation (Tanaka 2002). In these accounts, the space of civil society is described as an arena that is shaped by the state, and in which the state constantly intervenes. Considerable attention, therefore, has been given to the discourses surrounding the PAPs terms ofengagement — civic versus civil society, the "pruning of the banyan tree", and the "OB markers" (Chua 2003; Koh and Ooi 2004; Lee 2002). These accounts ofcivil society in Singapore are very much dominated by the work of academic scholars located in Singapore and elsewhere. Few of these scholars have been openly reflexive about their own "situatedness" in these debates. Many are employed in state-supported institutions, including educational institutions in which concepts of "academic freedom" are strongly mediated by practical considerations about tenure and promotion. Significant numbers ofthese scholars are also closely involved with NGOs and other civil society groups, thus blurring the line between academic and activist arenas. Failure to engage with a politics of location (and the associated politics of speech) has meant that there are few critical attempts to challenge hegemonic discourse about civil society in Singapore. Moving Beyond the OB Markers121 One outcome of this silence is that there is a tendency within the literature to project a romance of"more" civil society as ballast against coercive state power and its excesses. Not only does this overlook the complexity of state-society relations, but there is also a propensity to "obscure the great diversity ofsocial and political elements in civil society in favour ofa general...