Hume’s Skeptical Crisis: A Textual Study (review)

In this book, Robert Fogelin revisits much that was covered in his Hume’s Skepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature (THN) (Routledge 1985). Even so, there is a wealth of new material here, reflecting a number of developments in Fogelin’s thinking about Hume’s THN. I shall highlight three.

In the earlier book, Fogelin had pushed a strongly skeptical interpretation of THN. Now, however, he has mitigated his reading somewhat, and is offering “a more balanced account of the relationship between Hume’s naturalism and his skepticism” (ix). Naturalist themes were present in the earlier book, but Fogelin downplayed them and perhaps overplayed the skeptical themes to counteract the dominance of naturalistic interpretations. But the difference now is largely a matter of emphasis rather than orientation: Fogelin now recognizes Hume’s naturalism is one of four “voices” that were each sincere and heartfelt, and which all deserve equal emphasis and weight (6–7).

The most significant addition is Fogelin’s claim that “Hume’s pursuit of a science of human nature itself generates a skeptical challenge that calls his naturalistic program into question” (x). In Skepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature, Fogelin had presented a variety of skeptical arguments and themes in Hume, showing that these were all there in the text and analyzing them in some detail. Here, however, he is concerned with connecting these skeptical themes and explaining how they naturally arose from the evolution of Hume’s text. Thus, although Fogelin is now presenting a “more balanced” view of the relationship between Hume’s naturalism and his skepticism, his reading of Hume is in some ways more skeptical, because it entails that Hume’s skepticism threatens his science of human nature.

A further addition focuses on the contrast between the openings and closings of Treatise Book I and the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (EHU). To support his main thesis, Fogelin draws out the difference between Hume’s earlier optimism for his new science of human nature and later despair over its collapse into radical skepticism with the guarded hopefulness of the mitigated skeptical position adopted in EHU. I found this to be the most interesting chapter of the book and appreciated seeing two texts presented side-by-side.

The most noticeable difference between Hume’s Skeptical Crisis and Skepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature is in their presentations. The subtitle to Hume’s Skeptical Crisis is instructive: A Textual Study. The book is “textual” in a strong sense: it concerns itself not at all with engaging the secondary literature or with contextualist considerations. The focus is on Hume’s published words. It is also a “study” in a strong sense: it concerns itself only rarely with philosophical analysis, philosophical assessment, or the application of Hume’s ideas to questions of perennial philosophical interest.

This is a significant change from Skepticism in the THN, which was much more traditional, and involved analysis, assessment, application of Hume’s ideas, and engagement with the secondary literature. Fogelin aptly termed his new work a “narrative account,” as he is tracking the evolution of Hume’s presentation of the science of human nature rather than analyzing it. In other words, there is little in Hume’s Skeptical Crisis of the form, “Hume says p, which could mean x, y, or z, and here are the reasons why he said it, and why it should be taken as x,” and much of the form, “Hume says p, and then he says q, and then he says r,” interspersed with observations about the differences between what Hume says.

Fogelin suggests that the material and his new thesis oblige him to adopt this narrative approach, but I do not see that. Furthermore I do not see that it is the most effective means for grounding his thesis. A more traditional, “analytic” account might have been more effective. Part of the problem is that many of the limitations inherent in a narrative project get in the way. For...