China and the United States: A New Cold War History (review)

i88 China Review International: Vol. 6, No. i, Spring 1999 feeling the weight of days, like people meeting years later. How to escape bitterness—we're no longer sour-green, (p. 95) Leung's careful and reflective dialogue with Hong Kong has produced in City at the End ofTime a different postcoloniality and a quite outstanding collection of "modern Chinese" poetry. Given the dearth ofscholarly and critical attention devoted to Hong Kong literature, Leung's poems are an invaluable contribution to the field of Chinese studies and certainly indispensable reading for anyone interested in postcolonialism and Cultural Studies. Ming-Bao Yue Ming-Bao Yue is associateprofessor ofChinese at the University ofHawai'i at Mänoa specializing in twentieth-century Chinese literature and culture. NOTES1. Rey Chow, "Things, Common/Places, Passages ofthe Port City: On Hong Kong and Hong Kong Author Leung Ping-kwan," in Chow, Ethics after Idealism: Theory, Culture, Ethnicity, Reading (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), p. 187. Xiaobing Li and Hongshan Li, editors. China and the United States: A New Cold War History. Lanham, New York, and Oxford: University Press of America, 1998. viii, 348 pp. Hardcover $69.00, isbn 0-7618-0977-5. Paperback $44.00, isbn 0-7618-0978-3. The central theme of this volume oftwelve essays, all prepared by mainland Chinese researchers experienced in both Chinese and American diplomatic history, is that the course ofrelations between China and the United States in the postwar period was dominated by the Cold War. Viewing the post-World War II period into the early 1960s, the editors promise readers "a totally new examination and a fresh insight ofSino-American relations" that provide "cross-cultural perspectives, resulting in a 'Great Leap Forward' in recent scholarship." Claiming to rewrite the history of Chinese-American relations in this period, the contributors attempt to explain "China's foreign policy-making by using new sources, employing new research methods, and applying new conceptual or analytical frame1999 by University WOrks in their researches." While adding some insightful commentaryand a myriad of details, the essays in this volume unfortunately do not fully measure up to the grandiose intent of the editors. Specialists will recognize familiar topics, ofHawai'i Press Reviews 189 sources, and conclusions in the complex arena ofU.S.-China relations. In certain cases, they will notice some lacunae in the coverage of existing scholarship. The book begins with a comprehensive survey by Xiaobing Li reviewing the interpretations in each essay. Next, Zhihua Shen offers an extensive evaluation of the relations between Joseph Stalin, Mao Zedong, and Kim Il Sung surrounding the events that led to the Korean War. Shen differs with an earlier contention that Stalin was the architect behind North Korea's invasion ofthe South. Contrary to this perception, we are shown a cautious Stalin who had to be convinced ofthe efficacy ofmilitary action in South Korea. Moreover, a reluctant Mao was not eager to participate, as he was concerned about being isolated in the Communist camp while combating the United States and risking the entrance ofSoviet troops into Northeast China. Although the author's analysis is sound, based on Chinese and Soviet records, his perception ofStalin is still disputable; odier recent writers describe the Soviet leader as encouraging China's revolutionary offensive in East Asia and Mao's early endorsement ofNorth Korea's thrust into the South.1 Nevertheless , Shen's portrayal ofKim Il Sung's initiative is a significant contribution. The rationale for Mao's hesitation to support Communist expansion throughout the Korean peninsula, however, is viewed differently in an essay by Wanli Hu. In his study ofhow Mao understood American strategy in the Korean War, Hu challenges the contention that China had neither the abüity nor the plan to expand its influence in Asia and that die conflict could have been avoided if each nation had clearly understood the intentions ofthe other. He concludes that the "way to the Sino-American confrontation in Korea was much earlier paved, and very well constructed," and determined by the history oftheir relations. Hu regards the Communist program of"national-liberation and anti-imperialist revolution" to be in direct conflict with American aggression, which was supported by a political culture and...