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Reviewed by:
  • Neoplatonism
  • Peter Lautner
Pauliina Remes, Neoplatonism. Ancient Philosophies 4. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2008. Pp. xii, 244. $50.00 (hb.). ISBN 978-0-520-25834-1; $18.95 (pb.). ISBN 978-0-520-25860-0.

In this well arranged introduction, Remes offers a systematic overview of the philosophy of late antiquity. She lists five distinctive features of Neoplatonism: (1) there is a commitment to a first principle, the One, not to be equated with divine intellect, from which everything is derived; (2) there is a proliferation of metaphysical layers and entities with a growing tendency to further differentiate ontology; (3) there is a hierarchy in complexity that reaches from what is absolutely one to the varied manifold of the perceptible universe; (4) the central layers of reality are essentially connected to the human soul and thus the complexity of thinking must coincide with the complexity of being; (5) non-intellectual life and striving is conceived of as the desire for wholeness, and the horizontal striving of living beings gets identified with the vertical striving towards the source and origin that is less complex. In discussing the first principles of metaphysics, she distinguishes nine theses on which her whole study has been organized. The first says that all that exists is caused by a single first cause, the One. On the principle of spontaneous generation the perfect entity is such as to tend towards reproducing itself. The different realms of being are not mutually dependent on one another; the higher realm does not depend on the lower for its existence. Discussion of causal relationships concentrates on vertical causation where the cause belongs to a higher realm of being. As the One by definition is perfect and thus the best possible universe is also a universe without unactualized potentialities. Thus, in modern formulation, the principle of plenitude applies to the Neoplatonic conception of the world. Moreover, beings can be characterized as having a threefold activity: progression out of the original state, rest, and return. All that is higher in the order of beings is more real than what is lower. This contradicts Aristotelian conceptions that existence as such does not admit of degrees. In the next thesis, all is in all, but in each appropriately to its nature. This is understood by Plotinus to mean that the whole intelligible universe is present in each human soul. Finally, we have the epistemological principle according to which like is known by like. She also stresses that concept of nature also changed considerably. A particularly important upshot of her account is that we cannot attribute any dualism, Cartesian or modern alike, to Neoplatonism. The sensible world can only be grasped through the intelligible Forms, which means that we do not have two independent worlds with entirely different properties and laws. A separate chapter is devoted to the discussion of Neoplatonic views of ethics and politics, which reflects the current emphasis made on these notions.

An overall objection might be that much more attention has been given to Plotinus than to the rest of the Neoplatonists combined. In some cases, it may be justified, but, concerning the metaphysical principle of individuation and the theory of the soul, later Neoplatonists did introduce novel theories. One good example may be Pseudo-Philoponus' discussion of perceptual awareness (commenting on Aristotle's De anima III 2) and the related problem of the seat of consciousness (in De anima 462.27–467.13, CAG XV). A minor remark might concern the use of "spontaneous generation" (43). The occurrence of the expression is striking in such a context since it may have been used by the majority of ancient philosophers to refer to a biological process, not to a dynamism characterizing the relation of emanated beings to the One. Calling Philoponus a Peripatetic might also be striking (81–82). The remark has been justified by saying that Philoponus had denied that nature does not [End Page 557] need a higher paradigm, which is true, but there may not be too many other characteristics that can justify such a claim.

The book is practically free of typos (but write Schäfer for Schaeffer on 94, 232). It...

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