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102. ONE CONSEQUENCE OF HUME'S NOMINALISM It is commonly assumed, and sometimes argued, that Hume held the Uniformity Thesis regarding causation : something, a, is the cause of something else, b, if and only if when a occurs, b occurs contiguous with and successive to a and whenever anything relevantly similar to a, "no matter where or when, observed or unobserved," something relevantly similar to b occurs. Everyone knows that Hume denies there is any necessary connection between a cause and its effect. Since the invariability of conjunctions of causes and effects follows from their necessary connection and its possibility is not affected by the denial of that conjunction, the Uniformity Thesis seems a plausible retrenchment. Besides, we should deny that a causes b were any similar a to occur without the occurrence of a similar b. So the assumption of the Uniformity Thesis seems natural. When the issue is argued on textual grounds, the appeal is to Hume's first definition of cause at the end of his long analysis of causation. A cause is An object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling the former are plac'd in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects, that resemble the latter (T 170). This is construed as Hume's real definition of the causal relation and taken to state the Uniformity Thesis. Both the argument and the assumption presuppose that Hume was concerned with the conditions for something 's being a cause. But, I wish to argue, in the Treatise at any rate Kume was concerned not with causal relations, but with causal judgments. He was 103. concerned with what must be true for us to call or judge a a cause and, only as a consequence of that concern, with what is true of a for a to be a cause. We must take seriously his asking us to cast our eye on any two objects , which we call cause and effect (T 75, my emphasis) , and his saying, after introducing constant conjunction, that contiguity and succession are not sufficient to make us pronounce any two objects to be cause and effect, unless we perceive , that these two relations are preserv'd in several instances (T 87, my emphasis) . To determine the conditions for causal judgments, one must determine what we observe of a cause, but in making that determination, I am claiming, Hume is not addressing the question he is commonly assumed to have answered. Making that claim plausible requires a detailed analysis of what Hume is about when he gives two 4 definitions of the causal relation and an explication of how what he does in regard to causal judgments fits the paradigm of analysis for judgments in the 17th and 18th centuries, viz. that given by Boyle, Locke, and --- 5 others of such judgments as "That ball is red^" I shall do neither here. I wish to concern myself with another point which is not necessary to make my claim plausible, but would help were it true. I shall develop this point informally, for it is prima facie implausible and I would like to see how it fares unadorned. If it fares well, there will be time enough to deck it out in symbols. The point is that for Hume one literally cannot think the Uniformity Thesis. If this is true, it would certainly help my claim, for it would not help Hume to claim of him that he answers a question with what for him cannot even be thought. But it is certainly an implausible point prima facie. We can think it. Why can't Hume? The answer lies with his 104. nominalism. Hume holds that everything that exists in nature is individual (T 19) and that this is true of- ideas as well as of anything else that exists (T 19-20) . Thus, when someone says, "Smoking causes cancer," then, if we understand what is being said and if anything comes to mind, what must come to mind according to those who hold the Uniformity Thesis is a particular instance of smoking, a, and a particular instance of cancer, b, and particular instances of the relations of...

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