In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Hispanic American Historical Review 83.1 (2003) 180-182



[Access article in PDF]
Haciendo historia: Entrevistas con cuatro generales de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Cuba. By Néstor López Cuba Et Al". Preface by Juan Almeida Bosque". Introduction by Mary-Alice Waters". New York: Pathfinder Press, 2001. Photographs. Plates. Maps. Glossary. Index. 203 pp. Paper, $15.95.

Scholars must exercise caution when reading works published by advocacy presses, and this is a case in point. Released in Spanish by a well-known progressive outlet, the book consists of interviews with four generals (Néstor López Cuba, Enrique Carreras, José Ramón Fernández, and Harry Villegas, a.k.a. "Pombo") who participated in the Cuban Revolution and later occupied prominent positions in the revolutionary regime. The interviews with López Cuba, Carreras, and Fernández took place in October 1997 (the month Che Guevara's remains returned to Cuba). The interview with Villegas took place in November 1998.

The October 1997 sessions consist of ideological cheerleading by two North [End Page 180] American "revolutionaries" who spend much time extolling their virtues as vanguards in the belly of the imperialist beast. Amid self-congratulation and bluster are queries focused on each general's role in the struggle against Batista, the Bay of Pigs/Playa Girón battles, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and internationalist missions, and their opinions of Che, Fidel, and Raúl Castro. Their questions read like editorials—several go on for more than a page—rather than proper inquiries, to the point of obscuring the historical merit of the responses of the first three interviewees. Nevertheless, there are some insights: for example, López Cuba's claim that antipersonnel mines are morally justified as "weapons of the poor" in technologically disadvantaged states; Carreras's claim that the 1962 downing of a U.S. U-2 spy plane was ordered by a Soviet ground officer against Moscow's orders; and Fernández's admission that the counterrevolutionary "bandits" in Escambray (1960-61) had certain levels of support that required the revolutionary regime to eliminate them using co-optive as well as coercive techniques. There are other noteworthy mentions, but the reader must sift through the bombast to find them.

Better is the interview with Pombo, which was more focused and less laden with ideological baggage. Because of his role as Che Guevara's lieutenant in the Sierra Maestra, the Congo, and Bolivia, the answers to questions about internationalist missions are particularly noteworthy. Pombo attributes the failure of the Congo mission to a combination of primordial African tribalism, international political betrayals, and the cowardice of certain African leaders such as Laurant Kabila. He mentions that Che was in Africa because conditions were not ripe for him to return to his birth country, Argentina (which opens questions about the purity of Che's internationalism). On this, as well as the Cuban role in Nicaragua (also addressed by López Cuba), there is much to absorb. Also interesting is Pombo's claim that as a black man he had never experienced discrimination prior to the revolution in his native province of Oriente (the poorest in Cuba), whereas he was actively discriminated against in Havana and elsewhere during the first years of the revolutionary regime.

Other recurring themes include the armed role of the Cuban people, the intensely personalistic nature of the Cuban leadership, the working-class origins of the leadership of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR), the special virtues of the revolutionary armed forces, and the hardships imposed by the "Special Period" brought about by the Soviet collapse. None of this is new. Some claims are debatable—for example, that the Cuban military is less hierarchical than bourgeois militaries (something that Pombo contradicts when discussing the need for military discipline and Raúl's role in imposing it). Egged on by the interviewers, all respondents maintain that the Cuban Missile Crisis was resolved not due to a Moscow-Washington entente but because Washington feared the casualties that would ensue on both sides in the face of an...

pdf

Share