A Reply to Ellin

A Reply to Ellin Gerhard Streminger Professor Ellin's very interesting and stimulating comments may be summarized in the following four points: 1. Hume's opposition to religion is even more far-reaching than I had acknowledged, since there is "no evidence" that any form of 'true religion' is to be found in Hume. According to Ellin, the discussion on 'religion and morality' in the second halfofPart XII ofthe Dialogues is "not about true religion at all," since by using the term 'true religion' Philo means nothing but philosophy ("being whatever reason can tell us about the question ofthe originofthe universe") and morality("being the set ofprinciples ultimately founded on inclination and the natural motives of justice and benevolence"). Therefore, "there are not four things: philosophy, morality, true religion, and false religion; but only three," and my remarks on 'true religion' are "a distortion of Hume's views, based on a misreading of Hume's text." I will try to show that there are slightly more things in Hume than 'empirical philosophy, morality and false religion' by collecting some relevant passages in Part XII ofthe Dialogues.1 Philo: But in proportion to my veneration for true religion, is my abhorrence ofvulgar superstitions. (D 219) Cleanthes: Theproper office ofreligion is to regulate the heart ofmen, humanize theirconduct, infuse the spiritoftemperance, order, and obedience; and as its operation is silent, and only enforces the motives ofmortality andjustice, it is in danger of being overlooked, and confounded with these other motives. When it distinguishes itself, and acts as a separate principle over men, it has departed from its proper sphere, and has become only a cover to faction and ambition. (D 220) Philo: And so will all religion ... except the philosophical and rational kind. (D 220) Philo: the vulgar ... are utterly incapable ofso pure a religion as represents the Deity to be pleased with nothing but virtue in human behaviour. The recommendations to the Divinity are generally supposed to be either frivohus observances, or rapturous ecstasies, or a bigoted credulity ... Amongst ourselves, Volume XV Number 2 301 GERHARD STREMINGER some have beenguilty ofthat atrociousness ... ofdeclaiming, in express terms, against morality, and representing it as a sure forfeiture ofthe divine favour. (D 221-2) Philo: True religion, Iallow, has no suchpernicious consequences : But we must treat ofreligion, as it has commonly [Editor: commonly for always] been found in the world. (D 223) Cleanthes: Take care, PHILO ... take care: Push not matters too far:Allow not your zeal against false religion to undermine your veneration for the true ... The most agreeable reflection, which it is possible for human imagination to suggest, is that ofgenuine theism, which represents us as the workmanship of a Being perfectlygood, wise, andpowerful. (D 224) Philo: These appearances ... are most engaging and alluring; and with regard to the true philosopher, they are more than appearances. (D 224) Philo: These fine models of religion are the mere product of philosophy. (D 225) Philo: It is an absurdity to believe that the Deity has human passions, and one ofthe lowest of human passions, a restless appetite for applause. It is an inconsistency to believe, that, since theDeity has this humanpassion, he has not others also; and, in particular, a disregard to the opinions ofcreatures so much inferior. (D 226) Philo: To know God, says Seneca, is to worship him. All other worship is indeed absurd, superstitious, and even impious ... Yet is this impiety the smallest ofwhich superstition is guilty. Commonly, it depresses the Deityfar below the condition ofmankind; and represents him as a capricious Daemon, who exercises hispower without reason and without humanity! [But] philosophical theists ... entertain, or rather indeed endeavour to entertain, suitable notions ofhis divine perfections. (D 226-7) I believe that these passages reveal a semi-serious discussion between Philo and Cleanthes on 'true religion' (after Demea, the orthodox, is gone), and if one adds to this collection other passages in Hume's work, it seems to be probable that there is a form of religion Hume considered to be worthy of being called 'true' (although he did 302Hume Studies A REPLY TO ELLIN not adhere to it). With some reservations, 'true religion' may be characterized in the following way...