Hume and the Limits of Benevolence

Hume Studies Volume 28, Number 2, November 2002, pp. 271-295 Hume and the Limits of Benevolence RICO VITZ What is Hume's position on the limits of benevolence, and why is benevolence limited (if, in fact, it is)? For instance, if a person's benevolence is limited, is it because the nature of human psychology is such that one is not capable of feeling benevolence for those with whom he or she has no "connexion," or is human psychology such that one could feel benevolence for any person, but given the circumstances of human life, one rarely comes in contact with people other than family, friends, and fellow-citizens? Hume's commentators have yet to reach a consensus on these questions.1 The purpose of this paper is to explain Hume's account of the way both the scope and the degree of benevolent motivation is limited.2 As I use the terms in this paper, the scope of benevolence is narrow, just in case the set of beings that can be the object of benevolent motivation is limited to a person's family, friends, and (perhaps) fellow citizens (cf. Capaldi, David Hume and Hume's Place in Moral Philosophy; and Penelhum, Hume, "Hume and Butler," and David Hume); the scope of benevolence is broad, just in case the set of beings that can be the object of benevolent motivation includes, but is not limited to, one's family, friends, and fellow citizens (cf. Õ rdal, Passion and Value; Bricke, Mind and Morality). I argue that according to Hume the scope of benevolent motivation is very broad, such that it includes any creature that is conscious and capable of thought, but that the degree of benevolent motivation is limited such that a person is naturally inclined to feel benevolence more strongly for one with whom he or she has a "connexion" (e.g., a family member or a friend). Rico Vitz is at the Department of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside, 900 University Avenue, Riverside, CA 92521, USA. e-mail: ricovitz@yahoo.com 272 Rico Vitz My principal goal is to elucidate interpretive puzzles about Hume's position on the limits of benevolence that are presented in the Treatise. The first two sections of the paper are devoted to this end. In the first section, I argue that there is strong textual evidence that, on Hume's account, benevolence can extend beyond a person's family, friends, and fellow citizens, and even beyond human beings to any thinking conscious being, including animals (see, e.g., T 2.2.5.14-5, 2.2.6.4, 3.2.1.12; SBN 362-3, 367, 481).3 In the second section, I examine two passages that might seem to be evidence against my reading, and I contend that neither passage commits Hume to affirming that benevolence is narrow in scope. In the third section, I turn briefly to the second Enquiry for two reasons—(i) to show that, in his later work, Hume reaffirms the position on the limits of benevolence that he articulates in the Treatise, and (ii) to clarify a helpful distinction between two kinds of benevolence that Hume makes in the second Enquiry, which is implicit, but not articulated, in the Treatise. I conclude that Hume consistently affirms, both in the Treatise and in the second Enquiry, that any thinking conscious being can be the object of benevolence. 1. Evidence for the Broad Scope of Benevolence in the Treatise One of the challenges to providing an accurate interpretation of Hume's account of benevolence is to clarify his use of terms in the Treatise. I will begin by elucidating his use of the term "benevolence." 1.1 "Benevolence" In Book 2 of the Treatise, Hume states, "Benevolence or the appetite, which attends love, is a desire of the happiness of the person belov'd, and an aversion to his misery" (T 2.2.9.3; SBN 382).4 Let me note three points in relation to this claim. First, benevolence is a psychological state—namely, a desire.5 On Hume's account, a desire is a "direct passion," which is an impression that arises either from pleasure or pain...