Hume's Associations

Hume Studies Volume 28, Number 2, November 2002, pp. 231-246 Hume's Associations RUTH WEINTRAUB I Hume's three principles of association, we are told by way of an introduction , are to account for the way in which "simple ideas ... fall regularly into complex ones" (T 1.1.4.1; SBN 10).1 It seems as if there is here a single taskone question to be answered. But the ensuing discussion, I shall show, reveals that Hume is, in fact, addressing two distinct questions. And the (single) answer he gives is pretty poor in the case of one, and quite passable in that of the other. II The first issue Hume cites in Treatise 1.1.4 is the formation of complex ideas out of simple ones. We already know—this is the burden of Hume's "first principle ... in the science of human nature" (T 1.1.1.12; SBN 7)—how simple ideas are acquired: they are all "deriv'd from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent" (T 1.1.17; SBN 4; italics omitted). And now, it seems, Hume intends to complete his (empiricist ) account of our concepts; to describe the way in which we augment our initial store, given to us in experience. Further evidence that this is Hume's (sensible) intention is to be found in his invocation of the conceptual similarity between different languages. It suggests, he reasonably thinks, that there is such a universal regularity to be Ruth Weintraub is a member of the Department of Philosophy, Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978, Israel, e-mail: weintrar@ccsg.tau.ac.il 232 Ruth Weintraub unearthed. Any set of simple ideas could (logically) be combined so as to form a complex one. We could, for instance, join together the ideas "round" and "loud," "triangular" and "brown," and so on. But instead, we find "languages so nearly corresponding] to each other; nature in a manner pointing out to every one those simple ideas, which are most proper to be united into a complex one" (T 1.1.4.1; SBN 10-11). When ideas are "united together", they are assigned a special word, a basic term. So, for instance, the word "apple" denotes "the particular colour, taste and smell" (T 1.1.1.2; SBN 2), which are "proper to be united," whereas no basic term applies to things which are round and blue. Our confidence about this reading is strengthened even further when Hume says—having propounded the principles—that "[a]mongst the effects of this union or association of ideas there are none more remarkable, than those complex ideas. . . which generally arise from some principle of union among our simple ideas. . . . Relations, Modes, and Substances" (T 1.1.4.7; SBN 13), announces his intention to "examine" them (T 1.1.4.7; SBN13), and then, byway of an "examination," says that the "idea of a substance ... is nothing but a collection of simple ideas, that are united by the imagination ... closely and inseparably connected by the relations of contiguity and causation" (T 1.1.6.2; SBN 16). Having formulated the principles, Hume now shows how they actually operate to engender complex ideas out of simple ones. Ill Have we correctly identified Hume's aims? Only partially. He isn't only, or even primarily, interested in the formation of complex ideas. He alludes in this section to another task: accounting for the flights of imagination we have with ideas we already possess. That he also has this latter question in mind is clear. His three principles are supposed to show how the "connexion in the fancy ... makes one idea . . . recal another" (T 1.1.4.2; SBN 11; my italics). If Hume's concern here were the formation of (new) ideas, it would be several ideas giving rise to yet another. And he wouldn't describe the case as one of recall; an idea that can be recalled is an idea one already has. Rather, Hume is here interested in the way one idea brings to one's conscious mind an idea previously formed and now lying dormant, so to speak. For instance...