The Passions, Character, and the Self in Hume

Hume Studies Volume 28, Number 2, November 2002, pp. 175-193 The Passions, Character, and the Self in Hume EUGENIO LECALDANO 1. The Self Beyond Book 1 of the Treatise In the long history of the interpretations of Hume's theses on the self and personal identity, it is by now widely accepted that the conclusions reached in the first book of the Treatise must be considered in light of what the philosopher adds on these themes in the second and third books.1 Furthermore, there is no longer much support for the reading, which saw a contradiction here, given that while in the Book 1 he denies the reality of the self or of personal identity, he then accepts that reality when he turns to his discussion of the passions.2 In presenting a more comprehensive reading of the theses of Hume on the self in the Treatise as a whole, it is essential not to lose sight of what Hume himself declared in Book 1, that "we must distinguish betwixt personal identity, as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves" (T 1.4.6.5; SBN 253).3 But having recognized the necessity of integrating the theses on the self of Book 1 with those advanced in the latter two books, there are still divergent opinions on what meaning should be assigned to this integration. The relationship between what Hume writes on the self in Books 2 and 3 and the discussion of that topic in Book 1 has been seen, variously, as a mere continuation, as a Eugenio Lecaldano is Professor of Philosophy, Dipartimento di Studi Filosofici ed Epistemologici, Università di Roma "La Sapienza," via Carlo Fea, 2-Roma (00161), Italy, e-mail: eugenio.lecaldano@uniromal.it 176 Eugenio Lecaldano new development in a continuous interpretation, or, rather, as a completely new posing of the question, with its own new solution.4 As I have argued elsewhere,5 there are good reasons to accept the interpretation of Annette Baier, according to which the passage to Book 2 represents a real reimposition of the question of the self after the skeptical conclusions reached in Book I.6 But even this argument represents, obviously, only a first, generic interpretation. Further specifications must be made about the way in which Hume poses his explanation of the nature of the self in Book 2. Furthermore, we must also explore the way in which the analysis of the self that makes reference to the passions and to sympathy in Book 2 connects to the discussion in Book 3 of the self and its character, which is presented there at the center of evaluations in terms of virtue and vice. In this paper, I seek to offer a specific approach to these problems, not so much discussing Hume's view of the self in general, but seeking rather to shed light on what he writes on the awareness that each person has of his or her own self. Hume explores this particular dimension of the question both in his discussion of the intellect and in his treatment of passions and of morals . That is, Hume offers indications on how a person becomes aware of himself by perceiving himself intellectually, by considering himself at the center of his own passional life, or by considering his own character from a moral point of view. In tracing the way in which Hume faces the question of the self as a question of one's own self, I will not only interpret the text of this argument, but I will also highlight some more general points Hume makes with reference to the whole of his philosophy in the Treatise. I will examine Hume's affirmations on the self in an effort to show how these affirmations support the argument that the reality of the self is presented in the Treatise principally as something perceived at the level of the passions and, more properly , as a sort of moral sentiment. This analysis can also be the basis for taking a position on some of the most controversial points in the interpretation of what Hume had to...