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Reviewed by:
  • The French Betrayal of Rwanda
  • Emmanuel Viret
Daniela Kroslak . The French Betrayal of Rwanda. Bloomingon: Indiana University Press, 2008. xvi + 330 pp. Notes. Chronology. Bibliography. Index. $65.00. Cloth. $24.95. Paper.

Daniela Kroslak provides a systematic analysis of the French involvement in the Rwandan genocide, examining it in terms of three main criteria: knowledge of what was happening on the ground in Rwanda from 1990 to 1994; involvement with the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and the [End Page 188] then-Presidential Party (MRND, Mouvement Républicain National pour la Démocratie et le Développement); and the capacity to intervene to protect people threatened by rising extremists and slaughtered between April and July 1994. She applies this analytical framework to French activities prior to the genocide and during the genocide itself.

Kroslak's conclusions are incontrovertible: while France was not a perpetrator of the genocide, it "can be held responsible for acts of commission and omission." Paris did not stop its diplomatic and military assistance to the Habyarimana regime after the proof of widespread massacres was well established. Despite the embargo, weapons were delivered to Rwanda long after the massacres had begun. After the death of Habyarimana, France was the only country to recognize the government that committed the genocide. Backing that government, Paris announced an official position that linked the cessation of the killings to the signing of a cease-fire. Initiated under a United Nations mandate, France's "Opération Turquoise" saved between ten thousand and seventeen thousand lives; but it also helped members of the genocidal apparatus flee the country. The chapter focusing on the decision-making process at the U.N. headquarters in New York, from the downsizing of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to the launching of Opération Turquoise, proves particularly interesting.

Although sharing this burden of responsibility with other nations (namely Great Britain and the United States), France did not use its position in the U.N. Security Council to stop the killings while it was still possible. France chose not to provide other members of the Security Council with information collected in Rwanda over the previous years and during Opération Amaryllis, set up to evacuate its civilians from Kigali after the beginning of the genocide. Finally, Opération Turquoise was organized under French command as a humanitarian operation led by elite soldiers armed to the teeth.

Two main criticisms can be raised about this book. The first is methodological. Kroslak's argument relies only on secondary sources, mainly official reports and press releases. Much of the French files covering this period are still obviously under seal. But the Ministry of Defense in Kigali and the FAR each have their own archives. Were they not accessible in Kigali? Many of the principal actors of the Franco-Rwandan tragedy still reside in France. Despite citing some interviews, most of them anonymous, Kroslak seems not to have talked to many of these persons: figures such as Marcel Debarge, the former French Minister of Cooperation (who called for the creation of a Hutu Front in February 1993), or J. M. V. Ndagiji-mana, then Rwandan ambassador to France, and Dismas Nsengiyaremye, the prime minister in Rwanda from 1992 to 1993, just to name a few, could have provided important insights. More than fifteen years after the genocide, retired ground soldiers who participated in the Noroît, Amaryllis, or Turquoise military operations still have not been interviewed; such a lacuna [End Page 189] is, to say the least, noticeable (although the same can be said about all the recent works published about France in Rwanda).

Finally, there is a second question. To maintain the coherence of her conceptual framework, Kroslak chooses to treat the French government as "a coherent entity." But at the time, the exercise of power was shared between the two governmental parties, and the country was preparing for presidential elections. What were the consequences of this domestic political context for the way Paris addressed the Rwandan crisis? Did the French army lobby the Cellule Africaine at the Presidential Mansion? Did the rivalry between the Ministries of Cooperation and Foreign Affairs affect France's involvement? Closer attention to...

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