Humanitarian Intervention and Conflict Resolution in West Africa: From ECOMOG to ECOMIL (review)

John Kabia conducts an empirical study of intrastate conflicts that have occurred within the sixteen member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) since the end of the cold war. Although the United Nations mandated twenty-nine peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions in West Africa between 1989 and 1996, it had to scale back; this led to the emergence of assertive regional and subregional bodies willing to take on security functions to respond to the threats of civil conflicts. Though the initial purpose of ECOWAS was to promote the economic integration of its members, the organization expanded its mission to deploy military forces into Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau in 1990, 1997, and 1998, respectively, and then to Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia in 2003. These interventions opened up new avenues for the maintenance of international peace and security in Africa. This book examines the challenges posed by the complex political emergencies that led to ECOWAS intervention.

Kabia's theoretical approach and core argument is based on a "solidarist" approach that argues in favor of humanitarian intervention to save lives and build peace through the institutionalization of democratic values and the extension of the rule of law. Kabia points out that African interveners lack the financial and military resources, as well as the credibility, to mount fully effective humanitarian missions without external assistance from the international community. He reviews the contributions by academics, policymakers, and international lawyers, and he examines the effect on such initiatives of disintegrating state structures and diminishing authority on the part of the region's leaders. The common themes that underlie the factors that have led to war in the region are amply discussed. Indeed, such a historical perspective of ECOWAS regionalism underscores the problems encountered, especially by its cease-fire monitoring group (ECOMOG). Issues such as the Francophone–Anglophone rivalry, the tensions between France and Nigeria, and Nigeria's hegemonic ambitions in the region are explored in detail.

Particular clarity marks his analysis of both ECOMOG's interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, both of which were conducted with the support of both subregional actors and the wider community, but in which ECOMOG's working relationship with the U.N.'s presence was poor. The failures of the ECOWAS mission to Guinea Bissau are also analyzed, as well as its failure in 1997 to achieve a lasting peace in Liberia, which eventually led to the country's relapse into war in 2003. The slight success of the mission in Côte d'Ivoire is attributed in part to the presence of French troops. Noting the absence of Nigerian participation in Guinea Bissau and in Côte d'Ivoire, he makes a case for Nigeria's inclusion in further missions In the final substantive chapter, Kabia discusses the changes that ECOWAS has made in its approaches to enhance security, conflict resolution, and management through its protocols of December 1999 and June 2006. He elaborates on their shortcomings for subregional security and argues in particular for greater attention to the need for small arms control in the region and for further extraregional support in building up West African militaries.

The book is very well written, and the references take the reader to all of the authors and the works mentioned in the text.