Rationalism, Sentimentalism, and Ralph Cudworth

Hume Studies Volume 30, Number 1, April 2004, pp. 149-181 Rationalism; Sentimentalism, and Ralph Cudworth MICHAEL B. GILL Section 1 Moral rationalism is the view that morality originates in reason alone. It is often contrasted with moral sentimentalism, which is the view that the origin of morality lies at least partly in (non-rational) sentiment. The eighteenth century saw pitched philosophical battles between rationalists and sentimentalists, and the issue continues to fuel disputes among moral philosophers today. The eighteenth-century rationalists took Ralph Cudworth to be one of their champions, and the sentimentalists ofthe period—Hume among them—agreed, placing Cudworth squarely in the opposing camp.1 This view of Cudworth as moral rationalist was further solidified in 1897, when Selby-Bigge published his influential two-volume collection of the writings of the British moralists.2 In his preface, Selby-Bigge explained that the first volume contained the writings of moral sentimentalists and the second volume the writings of moral rationalists. Cudworth appeared in the second—the rationalist—volume. Passmore has argued, however, that we should not think of Cudworth as a moral rationalist.3 Proper attention to all of Cudworth's writings, Passmore maintains, reveals that his position was in important respects much closer to that of sentimentalists such as Hutcheson and Hume than it was to rationalists such as Clarke and Balguy. Both characterizations of Cudworth are accurate, up to a point. The mistake is to think that Cudworth's overall philosophy falls neatly onto one side of the rationalist-sentimentalist distinction or the other. Michael B. Gill is Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721-0027, USA. e-mail: gillm@u.arizona.edu 150 Michael B. Gill Part of the explanation for Cudworth's not fitting squarely into the rationalist or sentimentalist camp is simply that at the time he was writing, the distinction had not yet been sharply formulated.4 But Cudworth also vacillated. In certain works, he implied that passion is the leading player in the righteous life, and that rationality plays a relatively minor role. In other works, he implied that rationality is essential, and that passion is dispensable. Cudworth thus anticipated aspects of both sentimentalism and rationalism, and an examination of his views can shed valuable light on that later debate. Perhaps most importantly, we can look to Cudworth to find the deepest common ground between the later rationalists and sentimentalists. For while Cudworth vacillated between a proto-sentimentalism and rationalist position, he always remained firmly and clearly committed to the idea that to live righteously consists of acting in accord with principles internal to one's own constitution; he always remained firmly and clearly opposed to the idea that to live righteously one had to depend on the assistance of some external force. And with Cudworth's goal of showing that morality originates in principles internal to each individual, both the rationalists and sentimentalists would agree. In section two of this paper, I will explain the conception of morality implied by two sermons Cudworth gave in 1647.5 In section three, I will explain the conception of morality implied by Cudworth's posthumously-published Treatise on Eternal and Immutable Morality.6 In section four, I will explain how the proto-sentimentalist conception of morality in the 1647 sermons conflicts with the rationalist conception of TEIM. In section five, I will address possible lines of reconciliation between the sermons and TEIM. And in section six, I will ask why Cudworth may have expounded these two different positions and elaborate on what lies in common beneath them. Before beginning, however, I need to make two preliminary points. First, let me describe in broad outline the distinction between rationalism and sentimentalism that I will be working with. Rationalism, as I will understand it here, implies that a person can fully grasp morality by exercising rationality alone. So according to this conception of rationalism, a being who is perfectly rational but possesses no non-rational sentiments whatsoever can apprehend morality, and a person whose non-rational sentiments are corrupted but whose rationality functions correctly can apprehend morality as well. Sentimentalism, in contrast, implies that a person can grasp morality only if he...