Of Miracles and Evidential Probability: Hume's "Abject Failure" Vindicated

Hume Studies Volume 31, Number 1, April 2005, pp. 37-61 Of Miracles and Evidential Probability: Hume's "Abject Failure" Vindicated WILLIAM L. VANDERBURGH It is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits. —Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1094b24-25 1. Introduction In Hume's Abject Failure: The Argument Against Miracles,1 the eminent philosopher of science John Earman applies his considerable philosophical, technical, and rhetorical skills to "Of Miracles," the famous tenth section of David Hume's Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, and he concludes that it is deeply flawed: "Of Miracles" is an abject failure. It is not simply that Hume's essay does not achieve its goals, but that his goals are ambiguous and confused. Most of Hume's considerations are unoriginal, warmed over versions of arguments that are found in the writings of his predecessors and contemporaries . And the parts of "Of Miracles" that set Hume apart do not stand up to scrutiny. Worse still, the essay reveals the weakness and the poverty of Hume's own account of induction and probabilistic reasoning. And to cap it all off, the essay represents the kind of overreaching that gives philosophy a bad name. (Earman, 3) William L. Vanderburgh is Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Wichita State University, Wichita, KS 67260-0074, USA. e-mail: william.vanderburgh@wichita.edu 38 William L. Vanderburgh This is strong stuff. It is also, I think, almost entirely mistaken.2 In this paper I argue that Earman's critique fails to hit home because he both misunderstands the aims and principles of Hume's epistemology in general, and misconstrues the argument against miracles in particular. A key point against Earman, as Dorothy Coleman3 shows, is that Hume's approach to evidential probability has an entirely different structure and basis than does the mathematical theory of probability Earman employs in his attack. Many other commentators on "Of Miracles"—both pro and con—have made a similar interpretive error.4 Since Earman and others get Hume's argument against miracles wrong by making errors about key points of Hume's epistemology, I begin by locating the argument against miracles within Hume's philosophy generally. Next I dissect some of Earman's errors, and finally I extend Coleman's idea that Hume holds a nonPascalian theory of evidential probability by filling in some historical background and by providing the beginnings of a philosophical defense of that theory. The upshot is that although Hume's argument against miracles may well be flawed, it is certainly not an abject failure. 2. "Of Miracles": Its Context and Main Contentions "Of Miracles" was a lightening rod for debate in Hume's own time and has never ceased to be one.5 Some version of the essay seems to have existed while Hume was composing his Treatise of Human Nature (first published 1739-1740).6 Probably for fear of upsetting religious authorities, it was not included in the Treatise.7 Hume's argument against miracles thus makes its debut in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (first published 1748). Its target is the argument that miracles provide grounds for accepting the truth of religious hypotheses. The thesis Hume defends in "Of Miracles" is that reports of miracles are never adequate grounds for belief that a miracle has actually occurred; such reports are, thus, never adequate grounds from which to infer the truth of any particular religious hypothesis. This result depends in part on what Hume means by "miracle." He gives two complementary definitions. The first is: "a miracle is a violation of the laws of nature" (EHU 10.12; SBN114). In a footnote to the same paragraph, Hume offers his second definition: "A miracle may be accurately defined, a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent" (EHU 10.12, n. 13; SBN 115, n.l).8 Clearly, a violation of a law of nature will authenticate some specific religious message if and only if it really does come about through the will of the deity purportedly sponsoring the miracle. Whether or not the...