Why Should We Be Wise?

Hume Studies Volume 31, Number 1, April 2005, pp. 3-19 Why Should We Be Wise? Miriam Mccormick There is a tension in Hume's theory of belief. He tells us that beliefs are ideas that, as a result of certain natural mechanisms of the mind, become particularly lively and vivacious. Such an account seems to allow us little control over which beliefs we acquire, maintain or eschew. It seems I could not avoid feeling the strength of such ideas any more than I could avoid feeling the strength of the sun when exposed to it. Yet much of Hume's writings on belief reveal that he thinks we do have quite a lot of control in the area of belief maintenance and that we can be blameworthy for holding some beliefs and not others. For example, he says that beliefs that are a result of prejudice, namely beliefs formed on the basis of "general rules contrary to present observation and experience," are "errors."1 It is similarly an error if I believe χ rather than y simply because χ occurred more recently and is thus conceived by my mind in a more lively manner. The man who trembles when looking at the precipice below him, despite the complete security afforded by the iron cage he is in, ought not to believe he is in danger. Hume says we "ought to regulate our judgment concerning causes and effect" with rules that are formed in the understanding. These rules teach us to "distinguish accidental circumstances from the effacacious causes" (T 1.3.13.11; SBN149). In the ûrstEnquiry, Hume says, "A wise man... proportions his belief to the evidence."2 There have been a number of attempts to explain how such claims are consistent with Hume's theory of belief. While I think these accounts have succeeded in explaining how Hume has the resources to show how certain people—namely the wise—can regulate and evaluate their beliefs, the question that remains is whether Hume's endorsement of the wise over the vulgar can be justified. This Miriam McCormick is Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Richmond, Richmond, VA 23173, USA. e-mail: mmccorm2@richmond.edu 4 Miriam McCormick latter question tends to be addressed only suggestively by those whose main concern is to solve the problem of how Hume's account of belief allows for some degree of control. I will begin by discussing why the problem of control arises for Hume and survey some of the solutions to this problem. I will then turn to the central question of this paper—namely, on what basis can Hume claim that we ought to regulate our beliefs according to the rules of good reasoning; what makes one idea enlivening mechanism better than another? I will argue that Hume's approval is politically motivated; he thinks we would organize ourselves in a more fair and just manner if more people regulated their beliefs according to the rules of good reasoning. On this view, there is a strong utilitarian strand to his preference for the ways of the wise. We will all be better off if more people choose this path, even if, in individual cases, following reason can lead to melancholy and despair. My main purpose is to understand the nature of Hume's answer to the question as to why we should be wise, not to investigate what can motivate one to adopt wise reasoning habits. But it is a virtue of my answer to the question concerning the source of approval for the wise that it provides some resources for explaining how we can become motivated to follow reason even when our immediate inclinations turn in another direction. I will end with a brief discussion of this question of motivation. 1. Hume's Account of Belief In Treatise 1.3.7, Hume discusses the nature of belief. If we believe something then the idea of what we believe is an essential part of the belief but, says Hume, it is "not the whole" (T 1.3.7.1; SBN 94). For there are many ideas of which we can conceive yet do not believe. What we must discover are the particular qualities...