Exciting the Industry of Mankind: George Berkeley's Philosophy of Money (review)

Any student of George Berkeley should definitely read this book. It covers a wide range of issues, going far beyond economics and giving much emphasis on interdisciplinary issues. It is written by a philosopher with, it would appear, left leanings, so he is in a good position to appreciate many of the radical aspects of Berkeley's thought. Constantine George Caffentzis takes pains to place Berkeley's philosophy in context and to situate Berkeley's economics within his social and philosophical milieu. This is true not only of Berkeley, but also of all major figures discussed. Thus, John Locke's theory of ideas—“In Locke, ideas did not just happen . . . . it has to be in someone's possession”—is linked with Locke's labor theory of value (191). This admiration does not mean agreement. Caffentzis makes a valiant effort to understand and absorb the economic milieu, but as I have argued with many historians of economic thought over eighteenth-century issues, it is inevitable that I should also disagree with Caffentzis. The author is good in acknowledging earlier commentators upon Berkeley's economics (such as Joseph Johnston), but he does miss a few general references (that even I know of)—Gavin Ardley and David Stove, to name two. Given the particular focus upon money, the research of Larry Neal would do much to illuminate the context.

In stating that Berkeley agreed with the “mercantile opinion” on labor as the ultimate source of wealth, Caffentzis fails to note that labor is the ultimate source of wealth for practically all economists, including, of course, Adam Smith (127). Why the sarcasm on Berkeley as “slavemaster” (126)? We can “imagine” Berkeley doing many things, but are we free to do so without some textual grounds? Caffentzis can be correct on the general position (“the economic problematic of Ireland was posed by the self-reinforcing polarity of a ruling class that could not rule and a working class that would not work” [133]) but off on specific issues, so that the overall effect is unconvincing. For instance, it is said that the migration of 1726–27 caused Jonathan Swift to write. Is it not more probable that the famine which preceded, and caused, the migration was more responsible? The emigration meant “cheap labour” in England (134), but Patrick Kelly, whom Caffentzis cites, clearly notes that the emigration was to America, not to England. Caffentzis has read the nineteenth century, and Marx and Engels, into the 1730s. This jumble goes on in succeeding pages over a number of minor issues: Why was the emigration of labor and capital, and not defense, the sine qua non of English occupation (134)? Did Berkeley really have a theory of wage hierarchies (142)? It is more serious when he assigns the tithes as a proximate motive for Berkeley's economic concerns. If this were so, why not go for commutation of tithes (145)?

Sometimes the attempt to introduce philosophy goes too far and ends by obfuscating the economics. In relation to Berkeley's views on money as a “ticket” or “counter,” Caffentzis provides an elaborate link with Berkeley's theory of spirits. I find sentences like the following to be almost incomprehensible. “The Querist's solution is to be found in the algebraic movement of the spirits which have been released from the delusion that their pegs and counters are the ‘solution' to their question, rather it is their activity that is the solution” (263). In developing this theme Caffentzis refers to a principle of attraction between members of society. This is a proper characterization of the early eighteenth century, but Caffentzis does not develop its widespread prevalence as claimed by Margaret Jacob, an author whose later work Caffentzis is aware of. The absence of a compact and direct presentation of Berkeley's economics allows the impression of contradiction in Berkeley's...