Still Searching for a Pragmatist Pluralism

Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin Still Searching for a Pragmatist Pluralism Our argument in "Why Pragmatists Cannot Be Pluralists" can be stated succinctly. Any view that deserves to be called pragmatist is broadly meliorist in that it aims at the resolution of conflicts by means of methods that can be plausibly held to be intelligent, rational, open, and non-violent. Among pragmatists there are two general styles of pursuing this meliorist aim.1 According to what we called inquiry pragmatism, conflicts are to be resolved by the thoroughgoing application of proper methods of inquiry; this would require not only processes of ongoing experimentation but also efforts to maintain the conditions under which inquiry could continue. According to what we called meaning pragmatism, conflicts are to be dissolved by a pragmatic reconstruction of the terms in which the conflict is cast; this means that, when confronted with apparently interminable disputes, we ought to revise our vocabularies in ways that, as William James advised, "bring in peace" (1977, p. 349).2 In both cases, pragmatic practice presumes that (I) conflicts are resolvable by intelligent means, and (2) it is better to resolve conflicts intelligently than to let them stand. There is a family of views popular among contemporary philosophers, political theorists, and policymakers that is called pluralism. Although pluralism comes in several versions, ranging from Berlin-style ontological pluralism to later Rawlsian epistemic or procedural varieties, all pluralisms deny (1) or (2), or both. Our conclusion is that pragmatists cannot be pluralists. Of course, this obvious demonstration would be of no interest were it not for the fact that contemporary pragmatists working in the classical idiom are fond of characterizing themselves as pluralists. It would be uncharitable to conclude simply that all such pragmatists are caught in a simple confusion, so these theorists must mean by 'pluralism' something else. But what>. Our survey of the contemporary literature found, despite frequent if not excessive use of the term, no explicit analysis of the concept and no comparative engagement with the alternative versions of pluralism in currency. We thus took up the task of trying to discern for ourselves what pragmatists mean by 'pluralism'. This led us to the view that by 'pluralism' pragmatists typically mean a principled commitment to admirable habits of openness, inclusion, tolerance, anti-hegemony, and experimentalism in all aspects of moral, political, and intellectual life.3 We share Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society Winter, 2005, Vol. XLI, No. 1 146 Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin these commitments, but challenge the value of the pragmatists' terminology. Our case against sustaining the pragmatists' habit of employing 'pluralism' as a blanket for the above commitments is itself straightforwardly pragmatic. As the pragmatists' commitments are incompatible with the range of views called 'pluralism' in broader, non-pragmatist arenas, the pragmatists' habit of characterizing their commitments as 'pluralism' can only invite confusion and encourage insularity. As both confusion and insularity are blocks to the kind of ameliorative social and political programs advocated by pragmatists, we conclude that pragmatists should drop the language of pluralism. However, we do not see our argument as simply recommending increased semantic discipline among contemporary pragmatists. The oft-cited but much less often followed Deweyan injunction to surrender the "problems of philosophers" and pursue "the problems of men" (1980, p. 46) applies equally to the problems of pragmatist philosophers. We today confront a social, political, and moral landscape that invites analyses according to which deep and pressing conflicts are the manifestation of incommensurable world views and as such are beyond intelligent or rational amelioration.4 Pragmatists must oppose these tendencies; accordingly, they must oppose views commonly known as pluralism. When pragmatism's aspiration to be a fully public philosophy is conjoined with its fallibilism and experimentalism, such opposition must manifest itself in direct confrontation with pluralist arguments. Thus, we conclude that insofar as pragmatists are not undertaking the project of critically engaging pluralists, they are betraying their own doctrine. In the spirit of open inquiry, self-criticism, and cross-sub-disciplinary dialogue, we delivered versions of "Why Pragmatists Cannot be Pluralists" to pragmatist audiences on two occasions. Our arguments withstood objections raised in these arenas. Here, we are grateful...