"You Talking to Me?"

Michael Sullivan <&John Lysaker "You Talking to Me?" Many Americans would be stunned to learn that the United States is not a democracy. "SAY WHAT?," they might reply. Consider the argument by Laura Dawn Lewis.1 She begins by defining citizenship democracy as: [Government of the masses. Authority derived through mass meeting or any other form of "direct" expression. Results in mobocracy or a government where the lower classes of a nation control public affairs without respect to law, precedents, or vested rights. Attitude toward property is communistic, meaning property rights are negated and ownership is by the people or state. In a true democracy the lower classes of a nation control public affairs without respect to law, precedents or vested rights. Lewis then goes on to point out that since the United States has a Bill of Rights, and since the populous is represented and doesn't directiy participate in decisionmaking , it follows that the U.S. cannot be a democracy. Q.E.D. In response, one might say if this is what 'democracy' requires then so much the worse for democracy. Or alternatively, one might ask whether one should accept Lewis's definition of democracy given the consequences of abandoning the term. Regardless, before an argument with Lewis could proceed, one would have to sort out the issue of definition. How can and should we delimit the meaning of democracy? Talisse and Aikin have presented us with a similar quandary. They define pluralism in a variety of ways that they find incompatible with some of the basic forms of pragmatism. The odd aspect of their approach is that they fail to consider the versions of pluralism available in classical and contemporary pragmatist texts. They thus leave one wondering what the pragmatists mean by 'pluralism,' and why pragmatists should be troubled by their incompatibility with the models that Talisse and Aikin privilege. Their approach to the issue is thus analogous to Lewis's approach to democracy. They stipulate certain positions for their presumed interlocutors, and then argue that their interlocutors fall into Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society Winter, 2005, Vol. XLI, No. 1 138 Michael Sullivan & John Lysaker trouble if they adopt those positions.2 But why should their interlocutors accept the initial stipulations? To our minds, this proceeding is akin to suggesting that Kant cannot be a transcendental philosopher since the meaning assigned to the term 'transcendental' by Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh is incompatible with Kant's account. Talisse and Aikin anticipate this objection, but their attempted preemption is unconvincing. They say: "Pragmatists may retort that 'pluralism' as pragmatists employ the term does not fit in our proposed taxonomy" (p. 112). This isn't a problem, they continue, because "...our project in the present has not been that of showing that the pragmatist conception of pluralism is incompatible with other elements of pragmatism; rather, we have tried to show that the pragmatist conception of pluralism is incompatible with those conceptions of pluralism that are in currency in the present philosophical debate" (pp. 112-113). But this is mistaken and misleading. First, because they never actually consider a pragmatist account of pluralism, they haven't shown its incompatibility with anything. What they've tried to show is the incompatibility of what they call meaning and inquiry pragmatism with views of pluralism they find current. Second, the paper is not entitied "Why Pragmatists cannot be pluralists along the lines of X, Y, and Z." Rather, it is entitled "Why Pragmatists cannot be Pluralists." The latter title is powerful because most pragmatists take themselves to be pluralists. Given this rhetorical appeal, it's reasonable to expect a demonstration of the problems pragmatists run into when they affirm a pragmatist conception of pluralism alongside other pragmatist commitments. But Talisse and Aikin have another reply. "The suggestion is that, if pragmatists want to join the current debate, they must at the very least take careful notice of this fact of vocabulary" (p. 113). First, we have questions about the criteria for identifying the "current debate" and the more "general philosophical arena." Philosophy is not a unified discipline and thus there are many relatively discrete debates about similar topics. Second, what are the reasons for imploring pragmatists to take notice of this "fact of vocabulary?" Why would that be a useful thing to do? The mere fact that people hold different views on a variety of topics is not, by itself, a particularly compelling reason to demand they debate. Lewis's use of 'democracy' is also a "fact of vocabulary," as is the Bhagwan's use of'transcendental.' What's at stake in these differences that should compel pragmatists, or Kantians for that matter, to take carefril notice? More needs to be said, namely, something along the lines of how pragmatist philosophy would flourish if it engaged texts like these, or what, in particular, these texts have to teach pragmatists. But Talisse and Aikin just point out the mere fact of different definitions as if, on its face, that was sufficient to saddle pragmatists with a burden to justify their use of the term vis-à -vis these other uses. On the contrary, Talisse and Aikin have a burden to explain what's at stake here for the pragmatist. Thus, we think that the paper falls short with regard to the tasks it sets for itself. It neither theoretically demonstrates that pragmatists "You Talking to Me ?" 139 can't be pluralist, nor gives practical reasons to warrant the discussion they recommend. Instead, they simply privilege the definitions favored by other conversations and expect pragmatists to acknowledge the authority of those definitions. In the spirit of dialogue, we'll nevertheless try to work within the framework they propose, and consider what Dewey might say in response. Central to their position is the claim that shallow pluralism is pluralism in name only and should not, properly considered, be viewed as an instance of pluralism. Securing this result is important for them since it severely limits the choices open to would-be pragmatist pluralists. Talisse and Aikin argue that shallow pluralism forfeits its tide because its commitments are common to thinkers like Descartes and Plato who presumably aren't pluralists. Those commitments entail (a) "recognizing and tolerating the prevalence of disagreement," and (b) "acknowledging that we do not currendy have the criteria for adjudicating those disagreements" (p. 111). It's worth noting at the outset that we're not sure what it means to "tolerate the prevalence of disagreement," and thus we're not sure if this holds true of Descartes and Plato. No doubt both Descartes and Plato recognized disagreements, indeed disagreements with empiricists and sophists inspired their work. But did they tolerate them? Talisse and Aikin need to specify the how and where of toleration, for one might politically tolerate a diversity of viewpoints, say by granting them access to the public sphere but still argue vociferously that some, or perhaps all of the viewpoints, are bunk. Or, one might seek to render the expression of some views a crime. All of these are possible for one who recognizes the prevalence of disagreement, but not all of them entail toleration. More needs to be said, therefore, to show that Descartes and Plato are compatible with shallow pluralism as defined by Talisse and Aikin. Regardless, perhaps Dewey could add another commitment to shallow pluralism, one that certainly would distinguish him from Descartes. On Dewey's view, one should forego a search for criteria that will resolve categorically any and all value disputes. Why? On empirical grounds, he would suggest that such a search is likely to prove fruitless in light of so many previous failures. Second, the becoming apparendy endemic to reality will require us to re-test our criteria with each new case.3 Third, the selective emphases required for fruitful inquiry, and the background conditions that guide those emphases, burden any demonstration with presuppositions whose validity must be presumed. No criteria for resolving value disputes will therefore remain free of a lingering circularity that must be vindicated in later inquiries which themselves will face analogous burdens.4 Fourth, the search for such criteria is likely to inspire dogmatism among those who believe they've found them. As Dewey says with democracy in mind, which he terms an "essential pluralism," "...its one great enemy is the hankering of men for unity of existence, aim, and law in whatever form it may offer itself (MWl 3.315). Finally, it distracts us from seeking more context-specific notions that may be able to break through impasses. Progress 140 Michael Sullivan & John Lysaker that resolves trenchant social disagreements rarely entails securing recognition of over-arching, universal norms. Rather, increased communication and compromise seem better suited to producing workable solutions. On pragmatic grounds, therefore, Dewey forgoes the "quest for certainty" that drives Descartes to seek more than the securities of moral certainty.5 Of course, the authors might reply that adding this commitment to shallow pluralism, call it abandoning the quest for certainty, turns it into another one of the pluralisms they've already discussed and shown to be incompatible with pragmatism. We don't think so. On their terms, modus vivendi pluralism favors either indifference or recognition. As with "toleration" in the case of shallow pluralism, we're not sure what to make of "recognition" in this context. In the authors' hands it seems to entail blanket acceptance, but as there is a vast literature on what "recognition" entails, including Habermas's claim that recognition is the pre-condition of meaningful debate, we would benefit from a more nuanced discussion. That aside, it seems clear that Dewey would never call for blanket indifference or recognition, so it isn't the case that the modified shallow pluralism presented above devolves into modus vivendi pluralism. Likewise, Dewey would never accept the consequences of what supposedly follows from deep pluralism, namely, an agonistic defense of one's own values. Perhaps Talisse and Aikin would suggest that just like modus vivendi pluralism, a Deweyean shallow pluralism would prove unstable over time. "If one side has or comes to have more power than its competitors, such a society will not remain modus vivendi for long, but will quickly devolve into a agonistic war among the competing factions" (p. 109). Of course, it's reasonable to ask how they have secured this perfect foreknowledge of future events. Second, even if one allows that power relations may frustrate efforts at maintaining a truce between competing views, it's not clear why this is an objection to the modus vivendi theory. It's as if Talisse and Aikin reject theories when those theories don't theoretically guarantee the practical results that Talisse and Aikin desire. But this is a demand that no reasonable theory could meet since not only can't theories guarantee that they will be applied in the proper spirit, they also cannot produce an exhaustive list of rules to govern the application of the principles they do provide. So, it may be that pragmatists can be shallow pluralists after all, and in a meaningful sense. Or rather, it may be that shallow pluralism proves less shallow when thickened with some pragmatist motifs, although in the long run, it strikes us as important, for reasons already given, to assign categories on the basis of detailed readings. More important, though, is the fate of the term pluralism. We agree that it needs clarification. Too often it is invoked to suggest what the speaker cannot cash out, namely, a convincing account of how to proceed when consensus breaks down and difference not only gives way to disagreement, but breeds the kind of hostility that transforms dialogue into zero-sum clashes of intuitions. But we do not think that Talisse and Aikin have done enough to "You Talking to Me?" 141 clarify matters, at least not with regard to pragmatism, classical or current. Nor do we think that they have sufficiently exemplified some of the virtues such a discussion requires, e.g. close and charitable reading and the use of nonprejudicial categories. But then, neither have we shown that any pragmatist has a compelling account of pluralism, and thus all involved have a matter to which further inquiry, perhaps collective inquiry, can be devoted. Emory University msulli2@emory.edu University of Oregon jlysaker@oregon.uoregon.edu NOTES 1. http://www.couplescompany.com/Features/Polirics/Structurel .htm 2. Among the positions offered, Talisse and Aikin seem to regard deep pluralism as the lead dog. We're unsure, however, how to square this emphasis with their claim to have "demonstrated that the term 'pluralism' operates in the more general philosophical arena to denote a series of positions that are not in agreement with pragmatism." Their overall conclusion seems to be that the only pluralism that deserves the name is deep pluralism, but it's not at all clear that the "general philosophical arena" uses the term 'pluralism' to refer to this position anymore than the pragmatists do. In fact, the weight of their own citation suggests that a position they take to be at the core of the "general philosophical arena" isn't really pluralism at all, namely shallow pluralism. It seems, then, that they've got a second project built in — namely, why shallow pluralists (like Cohen, Ackerman, Nagel, et al.) cannot be pluralists. More importantly for pragmatists, though, is the fact that according to Talisse and Aikin, there may not be a contemporary discourse about pluralism for pragmatists to join. 3. This claim is proposed in "The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy" (MW4: 3-14). 4. This argument motivates the early chapters of Dewey's Logic: A Theory of Inquiry (VNU: 7-141). 5. It strikes us that Rorty might be another shallow pluralist in this order of pragmatists. ...