Why a Pragmatist May Be a Pluralist

Michael Eldridge Why a Pragmatist May Be a Pluralist Being a pluralist is understood to be so much a part of being a pragmatist that Robert Talisse's challenge is met with incredulity by most pragmatists. Prominent members of the (2003) Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy scowled at the mention of Scott Aikin and Talisse's paper, "Why Pragmatists Cannot Be Pluralists," or uttered brief dismissive comments, as if it was beyond discussion. I suppose this is because many aligned themselves over the past several decades with others out of the philosophical mainstream, forming a "pluralist" alliance to challenge what was perceived as the analytic majority within the American Philosophical Association. Or, on a more intellectual level, we have taken our experimentalist, fallibilist, antiessentialist and antifoundationalist position to imply that one should always be cautious in one's affirmations. Seldom do we expect to find commonality on significant matters in a diverse world. Our pervasive democratic beliefs and practices re-enforce this tentativeness and encourage us to be tolerant. Finally, most philosophers are sufficiently skeptical and of an independent cast of mind that we expect to encounter intellectual disagreement within our profession. One is a pragmatist, in large part, because one lacks both Truth and Certainty and has come to value diversity. To be a pragmatist is to be pluralistic. Talisse is well aware of these deeply held beliefs and attitudes and has fashioned his argument to account for them. He has no problem with political pluralism, intellectual (and other kinds of) diversity, experimentalist attitudes and practices, and the philosopher's characteristic iconoclasm. He has often championed engagement with those with whom he disagrees, argued for an inquiry-based politics, and been more than willing to smash a few icons, not least of which is the pragmatist-as-pluralist one. So what is the pluralism that he finds objectionable? He has been very clear that what he is targeting is a view that is prominent in discussions of contemporary democratic theory that holds that "some, and perhaps many, ... disagreements are inevitable, irresolvable, non-contingent, and, in a word, permanent" ("Can Democracy be a Way of Life?" TCSPS 39.3). Nor has he been unclear about why a pragmatist cannot hold this view: Pragmatists are committed to the view of the resolvability of our disagreements through appropriately Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society Winter, 2005, Vol. XLI, No. 1 120 Michael Eldridge performed inquiry. But, as Talisse points out, this confidence in social intelligence is contested by some (39.11). There is no agreement among those participating in the discussions of contemporary democratic theory that a Peircean or Deweyan model of inquiry is either necessary or sufficient. Thus the pluralisms irresolvable differences have moved from substance to procedure. Deep pluralism remains and the pragmatist is committed to a method of resolving differences that threaten our common well being. Hence pluralism and pragmatism are incompatible. Talisse is a skilful and resourceful polemicist, and he is certainly knowledgeable about pragmatism and democratic theory. Yet I think his argument is problematic. I do not know if society over the long run is ultimately pluralistic in the strong sense. It may be that important differences will always be with us. But that does not necessarily mean that there will always be permanent conflicts about the same values and practices. If this is what pluralism entails, then, yes, Talisse is right — a pragmatist must not be a pluralist. And Talisse may well be right that this is the sense in which pluralism is understood in contemporary discussions of democratic theory. If so, then the pragmatist has a problem entering into this discussion as it is currently framed, for, meliorist that she is, she is committed to the notion of occasional resolution of differences — even those that now appear to be irreconcilable. The strong pluralist, as Talisse describes the position, is making a claim about a reality that is not now accessible to us. Thus it smacks of certainty and the a priori and other notions of which the pragmatist is wary. What we do know, and here I am making an empirical assertion, is that sometimes deep intellectual, social and political disagreements are...