Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters

Whether democracies are more or less likely to win wars has long been a contentious issue. The Greek general Thucydides' chronicle of the defeat of democratic Athens in its twenty-four-year struggle with authoritarian Sparta in The Peloponnesian War, particularly his account of the Sicilian debacle, remains the classic indictment of the inability of democracies to prepare for and fight wars. ¹ Indeed, for most of Western history, pessimism dominated thinking about democracy and war. "Democratic defeatists," from the French aristocrat Alexis de Tocqueville to mid-twentieth-century realists such as E.H. Carr, George Kennan, and Walter Lippmann, believed that democracy was a decided liability in preparing for and fighting wars. Particularly during the Cold War, the pessimistic perspective on the fighting power of democracies was dominant. ² Even leaders of the free world, such as John F. Kennedy, believed that when democracy "competes with a system of government...built primarily for war, it is at a disadvantage." ³ Despite the end of the Cold War, a few Cassandras remain concerned that democracies are unprepared to meet the next major military threat from authoritarian states such as China or international terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda. ⁴

Not everyone shared this pessimism, however. The Greek historian Herod- otus argued that democracy increased military effectiveness: "As long as the Athenians were ruled by tyrants they were no better warriors than their neighbors, but once they got rid of the tyranny they became best of all by a long shot." ⁵ With the democratic West's victory in the Cold War, a renewed optimism about the military prowess of democratic states has taken root. "Democratic triumphalists" note that an examination of major wars since 1815 reveals that the more democratic states have been on the winning side in the overwhelming majority of cases. ⁶ "There is something about democratic regimes," two triumphalists suggest, "that makes it easier for them to generate military power and achieve victory in the arena of war." ⁷

Democratic triumphalists offer different explanations for why this should be the case, and sometimes they dissent from each other's arguments; taken as a whole, however, they suggest two reasons why democracies tend to win wars. ⁸ Some argue that democracies are better at picking the wars they get into, starting only those they know they can win. This is the "selection effects" argument. Others maintain that once at war, democracies fight more effectively: They have bigger economies, form stronger alliances, make better decisions, have higher levels of public support, or can count on greater effort from their soldiers. This is the "military effectiveness" argument.

The aim of this article is to question this sanguine view about democracy and military victory. I make three arguments. First, an examination of the historical data and methodological approach does not strongly support the triumphalists' claim that, all other things being equal, democracies are more likely to win in war.

Second, the logic that underpins the triumphalists' case is unpersuasive. Specifically, there is no reason to believe, nor is there much evidence to suggest, that leaders of democracies are more careful in selecting their wars than their authoritarian counterparts. The same charges can be made against the military effectiveness argument.

Third, explanations other than those based on regime type more plausibly explain how states perform in war. Some of these explanations are well known. For example, an advantage in military power is often a reliable indicator of which side is likely to win a war. ⁹ The nature of the conflict can also influence military outcomes. In particular, the opposing sides in a war often have asymmetrical interests, which sometimes produce a paradoxical outcome where the weaker state defeats its more powerful adversary. ¹⁰ Moreover, states that imitate the military organization and doctrines of the leading states in the international system are likely to prevail in war. ¹¹ Nationalism has also proven to be...