In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

The Washington Quarterly 25.2 (2002) 59-72



[Access article in PDF]

Japan and the United States:
The Essential Alliance

Yukio Okamoto


On November 9, 2001, three ships from the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF)--the fuel supply ship Hamana and the escort ships Kurama and Kirisame--left Sasebo pier for the Indian Ocean. Two weeks later, two additional vessels, the Sawagiri and the Towada, left their home ports for the same destination. The five vessels became part of a multinational contingent of U.S.-allied warships in Operation Enduring Freedom. The departure of the ships marked Japan's first wartime dispatch of naval vessels for operations abroad since the end of the war in the Pacific in 1945. On January 29, 2002, the Towada supplied fuel to a British warship, marking the first Euro-Japanese cooperative defense action of the post-World War II era.

The twenty-first century presents a dizzying array of challenges for the U.S.-Japan alliance. Rather than a simple global bipolar struggle occasionally interrupted by the movements and plots of a few independent actors, today's world is a complex patchwork of large and small independent states, varied economic interests, and religious and ethnic divisions. These diverse forces demand the attention of the world's sole remaining superpower and its allies.

Even though Japan and the United States share a global agenda, the security alliance between the two nations focuses on the Far East. In terms of threats to peace and stability in the area, the main potential concern is an emerging and enigmatic China. China, however, is only one of a constellation of concerns that may pose a threat to the current political, economic, and military order. [End Page 59]

The Nature of the Alliance

The alliance between Japan and the United States represents the primary bilateral security relationship for both governments. For the United States, the alliance anchors U.S. power projection in the region surrounded by the Indian and western Pacific Oceans. Bilateral ties with other Pacific nations such as the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Australia, though significant, are national in character, not hemispheric. Neither involves the permanent stationing of U.S. naval fighting forces within the country. Japan hosts the only U.S. carrier battle group homeported outside the United States as well as a complete amphibious attack group, including a full Marine Expeditionary Force. Of the 19 U.S. Navy ships with home ports between Honolulu and the Mediterranean, 18 called Japanese ports home in August 2001. 1 Japan plays host to a significant mass of U.S. airpower, including F-15 and F-16 fighter wings. Additionally, Japan provides facilities support to a vast array of U.S. reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering resources, as was amply demonstrated when a mid-air collision with a Chinese fighter downed a U.S. Air Force E-3 flying out of Okinawa.

For Japan, the value of its alliance with the United States is even more obvious. Since abandoning its sovereign right to the use of force other than for purely defensive purposes, Japan considers the alliance the sine qua non of the country's security. The Japan-U.S. alliance is not just Japan's primary security relationship--it is its only one.

The alliance is a beneficent arrangement. Its goal is not to combine the might of two powers into a single great force bent on transforming the region. The Japan-U.S. alliance is dedicated to preserving the status quo in the Far East, that is, deterring the use of force as a means of altering political borders. In this regard, the goals of Japan and the United States differ from those of other great powers in the area.

One complaint that has been raised against the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is that its obligations are asymmetrical. According to the treaty, in response to any armed threat, the United States is committed to the defense of Japan under the doctrine of collective security. Japan, however, does not allow itself to participate in collective security. U.S. critics of the treaty...

pdf

Share