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The Washington Quarterly 25.2 (2002) 45-58



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Arms Control in a New Era

Rose Gottemoeller


From the outset of his administration, President George W. Bush has used two principles to change dramatically the United States' conduct of its arms control policy: first, emphasize unilateral action, conducted--if possible, but not necessarily--in concert with former U.S. adversaries at the negotiating table; and second, be willing to discard arms control mechanisms that might be considered outdated or harmful to U.S. interests.

By the end of 2001, the administration had implemented both principles in U.S. policy. The president announced reductions in U.S. strategic offensive forces to a level of 1,700-2,200 deployed warheads. A short time later, Russian president Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would reduce its strategic offensive forces to 1,500-2,200 deployed warheads. Then, on December 13, 2001, Bush declared the U.S. intent to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty within six months, stressing that the treaty is a relic of the Cold War and hampers the ability of the United States to defend itself.

These cataclysmic events took place in a policy arena that has remained fairly stable during the past 30 years. "Arms control" throughout this period has usually meant carefully negotiated agreements, whether bilateral or multilateral, with legally binding measures to implement them. To discard that approach, and the treaties themselves, in favor of more informal, unilateral arms control measures gives rise to several questions. Will the change be good for the United States, and does it help the country achieve its strategic goals? Or will pitfalls and problems undo many of the advances that have been achieved in arms reduction and control? Will the policy shift prevent the emergence of a new and more positive relationship with Russia? [End Page 45]

Consistent with the general theory that change is good, the arms control relationship has indeed become tangled in recent years and could use some shock therapy to remove the knots. Just as Bush has said, the policy still takes too many of its cues from the Cold War. At the same time, however, too much of a jolt is likely to break the thread. The particular danger is that unilateral measures will be rushed into place to supersede negotiated agreements before a high level of trust is established at all levels in Moscow and Washington. Bush and Putin enjoy a good working relationship, which cannot be said of every sector and layer in the systems that stand beneath them. Legislators, other political players, civil servants, and diplomats, even the Russian and U.S. publics, have far to go before they will consider the other country a reliable partner and ally.

Indeed, by insisting that old treaties should disappear, Bush may be undercutting his own vision of a new, more cooperative relationship with Russia. Without broad consensus in both capitals that U.S.-Russian cooperation is vital, the two countries might be tempted to walk away from interaction in sensitive arenas such as nuclear arms reduction, once the binding regimes are lost. In other words, an approach that depends on unilateral measures alone may remove the impetus for cooperation between Moscow and Washington, thus making the Bush vision unattainable.

To counter this problem and get the best results from the Bush shock therapy will require some careful work. Yet, the situation is not hopeless. The United States and Russia have established a number of channels for joint cooperation in recent years that is unprecedented by Cold War standards and goes beyond the strict formalistic approach of negotiated arms control treaties. To fulfill the president's vision and ensure that cooperation flourishes in the long term, these new approaches should be judiciously combined with existing agreements.

Where We Have Been

The basic structure of an agreement on strategic offensive-defensive arms control has existed since the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) and ABM Treaties were signed in 1972. Innovations such as on-site inspections have made the structure more complex and effective...

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