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The Washington Quarterly 24.3 (2001) 135-144



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Less Is More

Dmitri Trenin


The truth of that old adage, "Beware of what you wish for ... it may come true," is coming home to roost in the towers of the Kremlin. Even before the long-delayed victory of George W. Bush, the councils of Russian president Vladimir Putin clearly and strongly preferred the Republicans. They hoped that the heirs of Reagan and Nixon, as good students of realpolitik, would "take Russia seriously;" treat it as a "normal great power," as they did back in the Soviet era; and forget all that nonsense of remaking Russia in America's image.

What is most troubling for Kremlinites since the arrival of the new U.S. foreign policy team is not the tough tone that the United States has taken toward Russia, but rather the symbolic and actual downgrade of Russia's importance on the U.S. government's list of priorities. Being seen as a problem is much easier for Russia to handle than being considered irrelevant or marginal. Far from having the potential to become "another America," it seems the Russian Federation won't even get the chance to be "another Soviet Union" in the eyes of U.S. policymakers.

The Russian ideal of the United States involves the United States treating Russia as a coequal. Nuclear strategic parity, achieved in the early 1970s, was emblematic of Soviet (and later Russian) elites' attitude toward, and expectations from, the United States. Following the demise of the USSR, the new Russian leadership genuinely hoped for a U.S.-Russian condominium. Bipolar conflict and confrontation would in their worldview be replaced by bipolar entente and engagement. The world's greatest and the world's newest democracies would jointly continue to manage the affairs of the world. Indeed, deep in their hearts, many members of Russia's old elites wanted to be the United States, or at least to be like the United States. [End Page 135]

That this possibility was never realistic lies at the heart of the Russian elites' psychological problems with the United States. To continue along the same lines, however, is to miss the point: this fantasy is about the United States, not Russia. The dreams of a U.S.-Russian joint rule had barely been indulged before they were rudely dispelled. Indeed, after eight years, Russian policymakers and opinion leaders were growing heartily sick of the U.S. government's approach to their country. To the Russian political elite, suddenly nothing was right anymore about the approach of arguably the most Russophile Washington administration in history. The Russian critics' attitude could be summarized best by using the oft-repeated zinger of an early Soviet classic, The Twelve Chairs by Ilf and Petrov: "Don't teach me how to live my life, just help me out with money!" To their dismay, all the financial flows dried up after Russia's 1998 default.

Few, if any, illusions remain in the Russian collective mind about the United States. Perhaps, to paraphrase Lenin, we are at the point where we must "take one step back, in order to take two steps forward." At this juncture it may be helpful to think in positive terms of what Russo-U.S. engagement would ideally look like, from the Russian point of view. If Russians could be persuaded to draw up a wish list of what they would like the United States to do or (maybe more importantly) not to do, the results could well be summarized as below.

Great Power States with Privileges

Russia's assertive new leadership would highly value their country's full membership in the most exclusive club of world leaders, the G-8 forum. For Putin, Russia's entry would be a badge of personal honor. Russia's leaders are painfully aware of their country's deficiencies and inadequacies and of the essentially political nature of an invitation to join the group as a full member. Moscow wants Washington, as an informal leader of the G-7, to take the lead in this endeavor. Until then, Moscow still wants...

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