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The Washington Quarterly 24.3 (2001) 213-226



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Pragmatic Engagement or Photo Op:
What Will the G-8 Become?

William J. Antholis


Many who plan G-8 meetings think of the group as the board of directors for the free world. The big question for the 2001 G-8 summit in Genoa is, Does George W. Bush feel the same way?

The seven biggest industrial economies plus Russia represent a combined $30 trillion of global gross domestic product (GDP), or about two-thirds of world economic output. The group's annual meetings are small enough for leaders to sit at one round table for three days and discuss world affairs candidly. All the participants represent pragmatic market democracies. None are wedded to Communist or religious ideologies, and (despite Russia's stop-and-go transition) none are authoritarian states. To poorly paraphrase the famed chairman of the board, Frank Sinatra, "If you can't sell a vision for global leadership here, you won't be able to sell it anywhere."

Others view the board of directors' analogy as a bit of a stretch. Critics argue that the group does little more than provide a photo opportunity. 1 The participants' staffs negotiate the carefully staged meeting events and lengthy communiqués long in advance. The leaders themselves never could write the statements that bear their names, and some leaders barely read them. Some claim that the G-8 does too much--or too much on behalf of the rich and the powerful. The member nations do not resemble the world atop which they sit. Brazil and China have larger economies than Canada and Russia. China and India each have a larger population than these eight nations combined. Amid such high security, the meetings undercut the image of stable, open, representative governance that the leaders seek to project.

The criticisms have merit. Far from being accidents, each flaw springs from distinct policy choices made by G-8 leaders--from the scope of the agenda to the nations represented to the size and shape of the table around [End Page 213] which they sit. Such ingrained choices are difficult to change. Behind the photo ops, however, G-8 leaders have sought to address gaps in the format over the last decade, both by focusing on concrete actions and by trying to address developing-country concerns. In the process, they have built the G-8 into a forum for the leading democracies to develop common strategies to address concerns about globalization--concerns from their domestic constituents and from developing countries.

In Genoa, President Bush will have to decide if he will work pragmatically with G-8 partners or steer a solitary course in foreign policy. Does Bush want to put this group of nations to work? If so, does he want the group to reach out to developing countries and domestic constituency groups? Together, these two decisions--related in important ways--will be the first clear signal of Bush's approach to global governance. If the more unilateralist forces within the administration win these debates, the answers to both questions could very well be "no." Others are advocating using the G-8 for pragmatic engagement purposes. Recent events, however, suggest that the latter are fighting against the tide.

Bush's Choices

Bush's first decision will be whether he wants the G-8--or at least the core G-7--to become his inner circle in managing global issues. This choice goes to the heart of the administration's early economic policy pronouncements.

On one hand, Bush has suggested to allies that he wants to get the big industrial economies moving again--not just the United States, but also key trading partners that can begin to buy goods made in the United States. Moreover, the United States has promised to work behind the scenes to urge economic reform by some allies, such as Japan. As the president's top economic advisor describes it, "Quiet, frank conversations are the best way to communicate as opposed to the public haranguing that went on previously...

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