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The Washington Quarterly 24.1 (2000) 125-137



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Iraq:
The Exception to the Rule

Judith S. Yaphe


Has the time come, ten years after the invasion of Kuwait and the imposition of sanctions, to lift the military and trade embargoes imposed by the United Nations (UN) on Iraq to force compliance with UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCR)? The answer, if one believes the rhetoric of the 2000 presidential campaign, would seem to be a resounding "no": no to ending sanctions, no to flouting UN--and U.S.--resolve to change obstructionist behavior, and no to Saddam Hussein remaining in power. If one listens to Congress and much of the country, the consensus also seems to be no--not yet. We may have sanctions fatigue, but we are not ready to concede the battle to Saddam.

What is the impact of sanctions on Iraq and the success or failure of containment as a means to modify or punish Iraqi behavior? What are the policy options for the United States as a new administration takes over? Will it be possible to maintain sanctions on a recalcitrant Iraq, even if they are unilateral rather than universal? What policy should Washington pursue if Saddam remains in power? What policy should Washington consider if there is regime change in Baghdad? What will it take for Washington to de-rogue Baghdad? What should Iraq anticipate from a new administration in Washington?

Dealing with Saddam

As policy choices, the options for dealing with Saddam are few and simple: sanction him, ignore him, accept him as the ultimate survivor, or eliminate [End Page 125] him or pray someone else will. Imposing sanctions and seeking to eliminate him as the ruler of Iraq are options the United States is willing to pursue. Ignoring or accepting him, although preferable to some governments, remain unacceptable choices for Washington. Whatever the option, Saddam and the country he rules cannot be ignored, accepted, or eliminated without great risks.

Wayward Sanctions

Sanctions initially were seen as a way to influence, shape, or modify the behavior of a wayward state much the same way parents deal with a wayward child--you will not develop and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD), you will not frighten or invade your neighbor, you will not terrorize or oppress your people or any other people. Two kinds of sanctions were applied to Baghdad in 1991: economic sanctions, which could be lifted when Iraq was found by the UN Security Council to be in compliance with the resolutions calling for elimination of its biological, chemical, nuclear weapons, and long-range ballistic missiles; and sanctions prohibiting acquisition of military hardware, which must be removed by a separate UN Security Council vote.

In 1993, the Clinton administration enshrined sanctions in its policy of dual containment. Dual containment was meant to force Iran and Iraq to modify their behavior and abide by international norms and UNSCR. For Iraq, it meant forcing Saddam to comply with UNSCR dictating Iraq surrender all WMD programs, stockpiles, and sites for destruction; return all prisoners of war and stolen property to Kuwait; and pay reparations to those harmed by his military occupation and near destruction of Kuwait. Saddam was also required to end persecution of Iraq's so-called minorities--so-called because the "minority" Shi'a Arabs comprise nearly 60 percent of the population of Iraq and the minority Kurds comprise approximately 20 percent.

To enforce sanctions on Iraq, the United States refined its containment strategy. It soon became containment plus military operations, plus WMD inspections by the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), plus efforts to overthrow Saddam. Earlier this year, Clinton administration officials restated the U.S. policy to contain Iraq. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Edward Walker asserted in March that Saddam remained a threat to regional peace and would not relinquish his WMD arsenal or live in peace with his neighbors. Iraq under Saddam, he insisted, "cannot be rehabilitated or reintegrated as a responsible member of the community of nations." Walker and other administration officials insisted that U.S. policy remained committed to containing...

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