Balkan in Dependence?

Following NATO's military intervention in the Balkans during the past five years, two international "dependencies" have emerged in the region: Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosova. NATO engagement and the long-term involvement of international organizations in these regions has raised some fundamental questions about the relationship between external intervention, indigenous dependence on international institutions, and the prospects for local self-determination.

Self-determination, in the sense of state sovereignty coupled with indigenous commitment to democracy, is essential for the long-term security of the region. While ensuring provisional stability, there is a danger that current international involvement may actually hinder the development of lasting security based on the principles of self-determination. An evaluation of these questions may not only contribute to a more informed understanding of Balkan developments, but it could also better prepare the international community for future conflict prevention and peace enforcement missions in line with NATO's new Strategic Concept.

Contrasting Objectives

The international missions in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosova are similar. In both instances, international agencies sought to reverse the escalating human disasters, to prevent a regional spillover of armed conflicts, and to implant an international security force as the primary pillar of stabilization and reconstruction. Although Bosnia-Hercegovina has in effect evolved into an international "protectorate" over the past five years, Kosova is emerging as an international "ward." There are some important definitional and practical distinctions between the two cases.

Under the provisions of the Dayton peace accords, international actors intervened in Bosnia to maintain a single independent country while allowing for significant autonomy for the two ethno-national "entities"--the Bosnian Federation and the Serb Republic. To accomplish this objective, and because of the difficulties encountered in reconstructing a fractured state, Bosnia has in effect been transformed into a long-term international "protectorate." NATO leaders concluded that a hasty international departure could precipitate the country's disintegration and a renewal of violent conflicts. In reality, international agencies are "protecting" the survival of Bosnian statehood and the country's territorial and institutional integrity.

In Kosova, the stated objective of international agencies was to preserve Kosova within Yugoslavia despite the demands of the Albanian majority for independence and statehood. Hence, Kosova can be considered an international "ward" in that the eventual objective is to return the province to Yugoslav jurisdiction after determining that a sufficient measure of democratic development and "self-determination" has taken root in both Kosova and Serbia. Whereas in Bosnia international agencies have endeavored to counter disintegrative trends between the two entities, in Kosova they have tried to pacify an overwhelmingly pro-independence Albanian separatist movement.

Serious problems have surfaced in the imposition of an international mandate in both Bosnia and Kosova, evident in numerous arenas, including inadequate reconstruction resources; failure to generate sufficient indigenous capacity for economic and civic development; an insufficient number of international police officers to provide security to the majority of civilians; turf battles between international organizations; inability to eliminate the power of local ethno-nationalist warlords in parts of Bosnia; and the creation of deliberative councils without any genuine decisionmaking powers in Kosova.

In effect, we have witnessed the creation of dependency relationships between Bosnia, Kosova, and international institutions that may become more difficult to overcome the longer such conditions persist. In order to prevent a scenario of permanent guardianship, questions of promoting political self-determination, pluralistic democracies, multi-ethnicity, civil society, and economic development should be reexamined in light of practical experience. Moreover, implementable recommendations must be offered to policymakers and international organizations to help rectify their shortcomings, to buttress their successes, and to achieve a suitable balance between engagement and noninterference.

In addition to the negative consequences of a long-term dependence that stifles local initiative, the mounting cost and frustration of the Bosnian and Kosovar missions may increase congressional and public pressure on allied governments to withdraw rapidly and prematurely from both quasi-states. Such a move could prove even more damaging given the current necessity of the NATO military presence...