Tokyo's Temperance

The current debate on U.S. NMD has, without a doubt, placed Japan in a deep quandary as it struggles to articulate its position while valuing its alliance with the United States. For Japan, NMD can no longer be ignored on the grounds that it is merely an "internal American debate," characterized simply as a clash of "Democrats versus Republicans." Nor can it be neglected based on the argument that it is only a Russian-U.S. bilateral issue. If the United States proceeds with its own NMD deployment while disregarding the international implications of such an action, there is a danger that Japan could also face a backlash from Russia and, especially, China. The NMD issue needs to be addressed in the context of its ramifications for Japan's long-term security interests. Furthermore, Japan must accept the hard reality that the current U.S. NMD debate warrants a serious domestic Japanese discussion of its implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance management process, as the United States could pursue an NMD policy that would be adverse to Japanese interests. Under a worst-case scenario, Japan's own missile defense program could be compromised as a result of the currently planned U.S. NMD system.

Three Security Shocks for Japan

To fully understand Japanese NMD perspectives, one must consider three "security shocks" that Japan experienced in the latter part of the 1990s. These shocks have had a psychological impact on the Japanese, which is sure to tangibly influence the direction of the Japanese debate on the U.S. NMD strategy.

The first of these shocks was the Chinese missile tests over the Taiwan Strait in 1995 and 1996. China executed unarmed launches of its DF-15 missile during military exercises near Taiwan. This incident led Japan to doubt China's commitment to a no-first-use policy, while acutely heightening Japan's perception of China's missile threat. To make matters worse, a recent intelligence report revealed that the total number of coastal-deployed M-9s and shorter-range M-11s has been increased to 150-200 missiles and will reach 600 by 2005, should the current deployment trend continue. ¹ The incident has manifestly affected the Japanese security psyche, as it prompted Japan to join the West in criticizing China for its missile diplomacy and added to Japan's motivation to formulate new Japan-U.S. defense guidelines.

The second shock was the North Korean test launch of the Taep'odong 1, which provided direct impetus for both the U.S. NMD and Japan's theater missile defense (TMD) initiatives. Besides the fact that the missile was lobbed over Japanese territory, the decisive factor behind the joint U.S.-Japanese signing of the 1999 TMD Memorandum of Understanding was the rude awakening that North Korea's program, which now included a multi-stage missile, progressed farther than either the United States or Japan had imagined.

The third shock was a chain of events that rocked the foundations of the global nonproliferation regime: nuclear testing by India and then Pakistan in 1998, and the U.S. Senate's decision not to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in the fall of 1999. As the only country to have suffered a nuclear attack, nonnuclearization and nuclear disarmament are very powerful themes for the Japanese, which explains Japan's desire to play a larger diplomatic role in the global nonproliferation regime such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or CTBT. These recent events were thus a blow to Japan, and international confidence in the existing nonproliferation regime eroded as a result. Japan was particularly shocked by the U.S. Congress's rejection of CTBT ratification, giving credence to Japanese suspicions that the United States is no longer willing to sustain its commitment to allied cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation and that it is only interested in its own security.

Five Key Japanese Interests

The discussion on U.S. NMD thus far in Japan has...