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  • Congress and the U.S.-China Relationship, 1949-1979
  • Patrick Fuliang Shan (bio)
Guangqiu Xu . Congress and the U.S.–China Relationship, 1949–1979. Akron, OH: University Press of Akron, 2007. 409 pp., appendix, bibliography, index, and three maps. Hardcover $59.95, ISBN 978-1-931968-36-2.

The question Guangqiu Xu's book sets out to answer is: what role did the U.S. Congress play in the shaping of the U.S.-China relationship during the Cold War? The author's answers are plentifully rich. He probes in detail the influence of the U.S. legislature on this extraordinary trans-Pacific interaction in the thirty-year period from the Chinese Communist Revolution in 1949 to the establishment of U.S.-China diplomacy in 1979.

The Constitution of the United States empowers the president to manage relations with foreign countries. A balance of power system naturally attracts scholars to focus on the executive branch to figure out America's China policy. Consequently, few scholars paid attention to Congress. The existing literature, according to the author, was inadequate, and scholastic views were conflicting. Xu endeavors to redress those problems through his careful examination of congressional efforts in China policy making.

Drawing on his expertise in history, relying on rich primary sources, and going through five years of diligent work, the author has produced a solid volume that deals with a unique page of recent history. Xu made full use of The Congressional Records, legislators' papers, newspapers, Department of State documents, archival material, and other secondary sources. Through his skillful selection of convincing evidence, the author offers a persuasive conclusion: the U.S. Congress had been a prime factor between 1949 and 1979 in establishing the general context of China policy and had a wide array of instruments at its disposal to play a crucial part in the formation and conduct of China policy (p. 302).

Xu's book is divided into seven chapters, including an introduction and a conclusion. Each of the five core chapters investigates a particular period or an important issue. The first chapter discusses how Congress, within the three years after the Communist victory on the mainland, attacked President Harry Truman's China policy and passed legislation to aid Chiang Kai-shek. Congress repeatedly urged Truman not to recognize Beijing and called for a trade embargo against the Communist state. The second chapter focuses on congressional moves on China policy by holding hearings between 1950 and 1952. The outcome was the passage of the Internal Security Act, known as the McCarran Act, to round up alleged subversives under "loyalty clearance program." A number of America's best China experts were sacked from government jobs, creating a vacuum in U.S. governmental familiarity with the Far East and causing immeasurable loss in advisory resources. The third chapter examines U.S.-Taiwan [End Page 446] policy in the decade after 1953. After heated debates, Congress approved the Formosa Resolution and Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan, which pledged support to the Nationalist regime. The fourth chapter probes the significant role of Congress from 1964 to 1972 in creating a new climate in which national discourse on China was initiated. With the support of some congressmen and senators, President Richard Nixon ventured to visit China. The final chapter deals with the long process of normalization of the bilateral relationship from 1972 to 1979. In just seven years, many legislators visited China and supported normalization. Nevertheless, many hurdles, such as the Taiwan issue and numerous congressional hearings, slowed down the process. Through negotiations and dialogues, the two nations eventually established a diplomatic tie in 1979.

The book displays how American democracy, in particular the legislative branch, functioned during the Cold War with a special target of containing Communism. Differing from the executive operations, the legislation by Congress was not the decision of a handful of men; rather, it required majority consensus. For decades, the United States remained mired in a Cold War mentality, and only farsighted legislators initiated the engagement policy with China. Seeing the Sino-Soviet split, a number of legislators called for seizing the opportunity to court the Chinese. Those legislators utilized various channels to press the administration...

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