Abstract

This essay, which draws on a set of interrelated issues in the phenomenology of perception, calls into question the assumption that Buddhist philosophers of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti tradition pursue a kind of epistemic foundationalism. It is argued that the embodied-cognition paradigm, which informs recent efforts within the Western philosophical tradition to overcome the Cartesian legacy, can also be found—albeit in a modified form—in the Buddhist epistemological tradition. In seeking to ground epistemology in the phenomenology of cognition, the Buddhist epistemologist, it is claimed, is operating on principles similar to those found in Husserl’s phenomenological tradition.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1529-1898
Print ISSN
0031-8221
Pages
pp. 409-439
Launched on MUSE
2009-10-25
Open Access
No
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