A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy (review)

In this, his second book, Robert Talisse “attempts to make explicit the pragmatist roots and motivations of the concept of democracy” developed in his 2005 book, Democracy after Liberalism: Pragmatism and Deliberative Politics (viii). Inspired by the work of the classical American pragmatist, Charles Sanders Peirce, Talisse defends a substantive, epistemic conception of democracy, which he calls “epistemic perfectionism.” Pragmatists, political philosophers, and social epistemologists alike will discover in this book a provocative synthesis of their respective inquiries, which Talisse wields in the service of democratic theory.

According to Talisse, it is unfortunate that John Dewey’s philosophy has dominated pragmatist discussions of democracy, for Dewey’s theory is “fundamentally misguided and ultimately incoherent when taken as a social ideal for contemporary democratic societies” (28). Talisse objects to Dewey’s democratic theory because it is premised upon a “comprehensive moral doctrine” that reasonable persons may reject. But he also objects to Deweyan democratic practice, which aims “to coerce people” to live according to the Deweyan democrat’s reasonably rejectable “philosophical commitments” (45). Talisse argues that a Peircean conception of democracy is superior because it countenances “the fact of reasonable pluralism,” by which Talisse means, “the full and proper exercise of human reason, even under optimal conditions, leaves Big Questions underdetermined” (36). Peirce’s philosophy can accommodate any number of reasonable philosophical commitments (including Deweyan commitments) without undemocratically coercing people to accept any particular set of commitments.

In chapter one, Talisse challenges a common narrative about the history of American pragmatism, viz. that pragmatism is a particular philosophical movement that “developed” through the work of Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, and that was subsequently corrupted by contemporary writers (notably Richard Rorty) who call themselves pragmatists. But Talisse contends that the writings of Peirce, James, and Dewey exhibit deep philosophical differences that belie any claim to a unified pragmatist tradition. Talisse observes that James and Dewey’s varieties of pragmatism presuppose contentious philosophical doctrines, whereas Peirce’s brand of pragmatism does not. These differences lead Talisse to the provocative conclusion that there is “no pragmatism per se,” no “revival” of pragmatism, and hence no need to rescue classical pragmatism from contemporary encroachments and corruptions (21).

In chapter two, Talisse develops his critique of substantive conceptions of democracy. This critique rests upon his endorsement of John Rawls’ claim that a democratic society must respect “the fact of reasonable pluralism.” Most advocates of substantive democracy—Talisse includes both Dewey and Michael Sandel here—fail to accommodate pluralism because they would foist upon all persons a conception of human flourishing that a reasonable person could deny. But if we accept, as Talisse urges, “the core democratic commitment that the exercise of coercive political power is legitimate only if it is justifiable, at least in principle, ‘to every last individual’” (37), then these substantive views are, from the point of view of democracy, internally inconsistent because they are oppressive.

Must we then endorse a Rawlsian proceduralist conception of democracy? Talisse thinks not; and in his third and fourth chapters he constructs and defends his alternative. Chapter three provides a close reading of Peirce’s “The Fixation of Belief” (1877). There, Peirce argues that all responsible epistemic practices presuppose precisely those norms that govern proper inquiry. Carrying Peirce’s epistemological claim into the domain of politics, Talisse argues that Peirce’s “image of a community of inquiry is inherently democratic” (66), and that the “very same” epistemic norms that legitimately govern inquiry “commit us to democratic politics” (67). The norms jointly implicit in inquiry and democratic politics form the basis for Talisse’s “epistemic perfectionism.” The resulting theory is substantive rather than proceduralist in that it prescribes a set of thin epistemic and democratic norms. Chapter four defends the claim that epistemic perfectionism can accommodate reasonable pluralism. Talisse argues that his conception of democracy is based on a view of “human epistemic flourishing or doxastic responsibility,” which is “consistent with the full range of comprehensive moral, philosophical, and religious...