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Technology and Culture 43.1 (2002) 207-209



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Book Review

Planning Armageddon: Britain, the United States, and the Command of Western Nuclear Forces, 1945-1964


Planning Armageddon: Britain, the United States, and the Command of Western Nuclear Forces, 1945-1964. By Stephen Twigge and Len Scott. London: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999. Pp. x+374. £38.

Planning Armageddon is a fascinating and frightening history of the development of Britain's nuclear command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) capabilities during the period when the United Kingdom emerged as a nuclear power. Basing their work on the recollections of government officials and military officers in both Britain and the United States, and employing recently declassified government documents, Stephen Twigge and Len Scott describe how the British attempted to maintain an independent nuclear deterrent in the face of technological developments in both the United States and the Soviet Union that Britain could not afford to match.

Nevertheless, the British strove to maintain an independent deterrent, the authors argue convincingly, primarily because they could not be certain that the United States would use nuclear weapons in Europe's defense. They believed that a British nuclear force (which never deployed more than two hundred nuclear warheads) would cause the Soviets to pause before attacking Western Europe. At the same time, Britain's independent nuclear status [End Page 207] might give the British some influence over how and when American nuclear weapons might be deployed. As Prime Minister Harold Macmillan apparently told U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, British nuclear strength was designed "to prevent foolish decisions being made to our detriment . . . [and] to mesh the United States in totally . . . to the defense of Britain."

However, as nuclear technology became more and more sophisticated and expensive, Britain was increasingly compelled to rely on American assistance to maintain command and control of its nuclear deterrent force and on American intelligence assets to ascertain Soviet intentions and capabilities and the location of Soviet targets. In the early 1960s, Britain was compelled to request American nuclear weapon systems because it could no longer afford to build its own.

The administration ofJohn F. Kennedy agreed to provide this assistance for two primary reasons. First, the more Britain increased its reliance on American nuclear systems, the greater would be the United States' capability to limit Britain's freedom of independent nuclear action. Kennedy wanted to bring the nuclear forces of the West under American command and control. Accordingly, the administration agreed to provide Britain with submarine-based Polaris missiles. To ensure that the British would operate them within the NATO command structure, the United States insisted that the Polaris missiles be part of an integrated alliance targeting doctrine. By agreeing to British control and operation of the Polaris submarines, the United States helped Britain maintain its status as an independent--"albeit an increasingly dependent"--nuclear power.

British nuclear independence was also undermined by the decision to permit the United States to establish both nuclear missile and submarine bases in the United Kingdom as a way of reinforcing the American nuclear commitment to Europe's defense. The United States never accepted Britain's right to veto the use of the British-based American nuclear weapon systems. While attempting to maintain a British finger on the West's nuclear button, the British government was also concerned about ensuring the reliability and safety of its nuclear deterrent. Among other problems that the British (like all other nuclear powers) were compelled to face was the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.

By the early 1960s, a multitiered system of safeguards and release procedures had been developed to enhance British control over its national, alliance, and bilateral forces. So far, of course, these measures have been successful. Yet, as the authors point out, whether they will continue to work under the conditions of a nuclear attack is a matter of conjecture. And so too is the entire question of humanity's continuing ability to control the use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, as Twigge and Scott conclude, issues of command and...

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