U.S. Relations with Latin America During the Clinton Years: Opportunities Lost or Opportunities Squandered? (review)

This is a book that takes a first step toward defining the legacy of the Clinton Administration’s policies toward Latin America. The period between the end of the Cold War and the attacks of September 11, 2001, was marked by an absence of rigid global conflict, and therefore President Clinton took office at an auspicious moment. David Scott Palmer sets out to evaluate the Clinton Administration’s success by outlining its specific policy goals and then assessing its ability to achieve them. Overall, his conclusion is largely negative: “In spite of some successes . . . United States-Latin relations during the Clinton years drifted more than they developed” (p. 6). From the title, it leans more toward the side of “opportunities squandered.” Policies on immigration, Cuba, and Haiti veered according to domestic political winds; the Summit of the Americas’ Plan of Action did not receive consistent attention and support. The same was true of reducing poverty, discrimination, and environmental degradation, which was also part of the administration’s rhetorical stance on the region. The post-Cold War period opened up opportunities for cooperation that had been absent for many decades. The time was ripe for rethinking the U.S. government’s relationship with the Americas, free of ideological baggage—but it was not to be. The book uses the phrase “ad hoc” a number of times, highlighting the fact that the administration simply was not sufficiently interested to construct a coherent, cohesive policy orientation that went beyond platitudes. Policies were often reactive responses to high-profile issues, guided by shortterm (and often domestic) political calculations. Palmer concludes that “[a]ccomplishments and continuities were too often offset by reactive and ad hoc responses that conveyed the impression of a policy adrift” (p. 95).

Palmer carefully provides evidence for both the positive and negatives aspects of U.S. policy, but one could argue that the overall picture is not necessarily so bad. One success story is democracy protection, which in a comparative perspective merits more credit in light of the obvious failures during the administration of George W. Bush. The Clinton administration worked to pressure Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori to call new elections; to block Guatemalan President Jorge Serrano’s effort to copy Fujimori’s self-coup; to work with the Organization of American States to avert a possible military uprising by Lino Oviedo in Paraguay; and to encourage political liberalization in Mexico. When compared to at least tacit support for the 2002 Venezuelan coup and intense criticisms of other freely elected governments in the hemisphere by the Bush administration, the Clinton years show an attention—if not a consistent commitment—to democracy that is, in fact, rare in U.S. history (damning with faint praise, yes, but nonetheless relevant).

Given its brevity and clarity, this book would work well in courses on U.S.-Latin American relations. One minor criticism, however, is that it would have benefited from a theoretical treatment of the topic. For example, what would theories of foreign policy and/or international relations tell us about the probability of drift given the international and domestic contexts of the 1990s? It is certainly enlightening to consider policy outcomes in light of stated goals, but a theoretical context could have contributed to understanding the structural conditions under which policy is made. Nonetheless, this is a useful book that contributes to our understanding of U.S. policy in the era sandwiched between the Cold War and 9/11.